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Within seconds of sitting down at the computer terminal in
his father's study, ten-year-old Simon is connected to the Internet. A vast world of learning opens up before him-never
before in history has such a powerful network of information
been available to so many for so little. But Simon isn't interested in worlds of information: he's on a mission. He plays a
few games on his favorite gaming web site, checks up on
friends in their virtual hangout, and updates some entries on
his own web page-but not before finishing his research for a
report on Abraham Lincoln due next week. Finally, when it's
time for bed, Simon reluctantly ends his travels for the day,
logging off with a click. His mother, Susan, watches Simon
climb the stairs to get ready for bed, thinking about how the
new software she had installed on the family computer two
months ago has changed little Simon's life. No longer were Susan and her husband forced to be constantly at Simon's side
while he surfed the net-he was now free to explore on his own,
safe and secure. As she started up the stairs to tuck Simon
into his bed, Susan wondered at how the Internet, once a place
of danger and confusion, had been tamed: "Amazing . . . to
think that filters changed everything."
Those of us who are advocates of the Internet had better
face up to it: the Internet has an image problem. Time magazine devotes a special issue to "cyberporn."1 The President describes "horror stories about the inappropriate material for
children that can be found on the Internet," and the fact that
"children can be victimized over the Internet."2 Over 1,150 stories in major newspapers this year alone contain the words
1. See, e.g., Philip Elmer-Dewitt, On a Screen Near You: It's Popular,
Pervasive and Surprisingly Perverse,According to the FirstSurvey of Online
Erotica,TIE, July 3, 1995, at 38.
2. President's Remarks Announcing Steps to Make the Internet FamilyFriendly, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1077 (July 16, 1997) [hereinafter
President's Remarks].
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"Internet" and "porn."3 In some ways, the Supreme Court's decisive holding in Reno v. ACLU that there was "no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should
be applied to this medium 4 only intensified the problem,
bringing new attention to the difficulties of regulating-or even
monitoring-this diverse new medium.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the response
to Reno v. ACLU and the burgeoning content of the Internet
has been largely in the direction of technological solutions: especially towards filtering and blocking software. These systems hold out the promise of easy, effective, and flexible content selection-Simon's story represents the ideal of filters'
supporters-without government intervention. PICS: Internet
Access Controls Without Censorship is the title that developers
of one growing filtering system gave their manifesto. 5
As with any "solution" to a difficult problem, however, filtering technologies are not uncontroversial. They have been
variously described as "the devil" 6 and "the most effective
global censorship technology ever designed."7 They have been
roundly criticized as being ineffective, both overbroad and un8
derinclusive. And probably unconstitutional to boot.
It is into this thicket that this article proposes to go. Filtering technologies-friend or foe-are here to stay; we had
better learn how to deal with them. But rather than focus on
the legal/policy choices inherent in the selection of any regulatory system-legal or extra-legal-I attempt here to sketch a
way of looking at the issues raised by filtering technologies
more directly. Instead of extrapolating the technological and
economic development of filters and looking back skeptically, I
seek to understand how the filters of today and the foreseeable
future fit into the First Amendment of today and the foreseeable future. There are two requirements for this. The first is a
3. Search of LEXIS, News library, Majpap File (May 10, 1998).
4. 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997).

5. Paul Resnik & James Miller, PICS: Internet Access Controls Without
Censorship, 10 COmm. ACM, Oct. 1996, at 87.
6. See Lawrence Lessig, Tyranny in the Infrastructure,WIRED 5.07, July
1997, at 96, 96.
7. Simson Garfinkel, Good Clean PICS: The Most Effective Censorship
Technology the Net Has Ever Seen May Already Be Installed on Your Desktop,
HOTWIRED (Feb. 5, 1997) <http'//www.hotwired.com/packet/garfinkell97/05/
index2a.html>.
8. See generally Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA
2.0 vs. Filtering,38 JuluMETRIcS J. 629 (1998).
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realistic, reasonably detailed, and precise understanding of the
technology. Just as one would not expect to discuss the Constitution without knowing some intricacies of its operations, any
discussion of filters and the First Amendment must be
grounded firmly in technological understanding. The second
prerequisite is a vigorous attempt to apply current First
Amendment doctrine to the issues, noting where changes in
the technology or the law will reach different results, but never
straying too far from present understanding.
I approach this task from an operational perspective, attempting to measure the limits on government uses of filters
imposed by the First Amendment. My conclusion-that the
present technology and the current state of the doctrine allow
the government considerable latitude in this area-will not be
heartening to those who seek to send fiters the way of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA). But neither should it be
comforting to those who would seek increased government involvement in Internet regulation: a recurrent theme in my
analysis is the significance of private filtering choices unencumbered by government regulation. In the end, the importance of the ever-changing relationship between the technology, the law, the market, and the participants is the dominant
factor; evolution of any one factor will likely yield different results into the future. A solid frame of reference, however, will
become ever more important.
Part I of this article details the essential features of today's Internet filters. In particular, I make a distinction between a database system of filters, reliant on a central compilation of ratings and content identifiers, and an embedded
system, which focuses on the self-rating task of potential
speaker-producers. The embedded systems, primarily the Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS), offer the hope of a
rating system that is neither under- nor over-inclusive and
that is inexpensive, easy to administer, and potentially selfenforcing via users' choices to opt-out of viewing unrated pages.
Part IEthen looks at the potential for filters as regulation generally, noting in particular the economic and coordination
problems that are likely to prevent the spontaneous widespread adoption of a PICS rating system without governmental
assistance.
The essay then turns its attention to approaches the government might take when seeking to support filter-based content regulation. Part III explores direct government filtering.
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This approach is likely to be found to be an unconstitutional
content-based restriction on speech, in large measure because,
under present filtering technology, the "fit" between the ends
and the means would be very poor since the current state of the
technology in filters is simply not precise enough. Having determined that direct filtering is unlikely to be successful, Part
IV discusses indirect government approaches. First, the government could require labeling of Internet content but not impose any filters, which would simply enable end users to make
the content selection choices. Under the current doctrine, this
is likely to be a constitutional approach: attacks on it under a
compelled speech, interference with architecture, or compelled
association theory all fall short of invalidating a cleverly-drawn
government statute. A second indirect approach is government
use of a variety of techniques to influence the market in a way
that might support the creation and support of a PICS rating
system. Although some of these activities might raise unconstitutional conditions issues, they are likely to be upheld by the
Supreme Court. Part IV ends with a brief look at the role of
the state action and unconstitutional conditions doctrine, using
the possible analogy to the V-Chip from the broadcast context
as an example.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO FILTERING & BLOCKING
TECHNOLOGY
It is often pointed out, particularly in the context of the Internet, that technology can be a far more pervasive and effective constraint on behavior than the law.9 Properly installed
and configured, technological "code" offers a scheme of constraints on Internet content that are untiring, perfectly consistent, and allows a degree of precision and customization that
statutory approaches and even licensing schemes cannot hope
to match. 10 Thus the panacea of a technological solution to the
problem of content regulation in cyberspace has become increasingly attractive. 1 But it is important to first recognize
9. Lawrence Lessig, in particular, has persuasively made this point. See

i&.
10. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2353-54 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
11. See, e.g., The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, InternetOnline Summit: Focus on Children, Mission Statement (last modified Nov. 19,
1997) <http://www.kidsonline.org'missionl> (encouraging technological "user
empowerment tools" to shield children from inappropriate material).
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that the true problem that content-filtering seeks to solve is informational, not technological.

A. THE MODES OF FILTERING
Whatever you call it-content selection, content regulation, editing, or censorship-the tricky part is the information.
The objective is to prevent certain materials or content from
arriving in places where they are not wanted. Mom or Dad
wants to keep smut out of the kids' computer. The boss wants
to keep an orderly working environment. And perhaps the
government censor wants to keep antigovernment ideas from
taking root. Although one may disagree with the particular
applications, the constituent parts of any solution to these
problems are the same: control over the means of distribution,
and information about the content itself. With perfect control
over the distribution and perfect information, the solution is
achieved.
This solution set is not unique to Internet content. Preannounced guides (information) and channel-changers (control)
are used to "regulate" what appears on our televisions. Given
prior knowledge of what junk mail would arrive in this afternoon's mail, one could confidently "filter" out the unwanted

material-or have someone else do it.12

Among the moving parts here-information and controlit seems clear that society has a considerably stronger grip on
the means of controlling distribution than on the information
required to effectively filter. Television guides are not perfect,
and today's mail is hard to predict. Therefore, a set of secondbest techniques have developed: channel surfing (lingering on a
channel only long enough to ascertain its content) and
"envelope guessing" (discarding mail based on a quick glance at
the envelope) are each attempts to resolve the information
problem.
Information is what the new technology of filters really
provides. Conceptually, the filtering of content in cyberspace
first assumes that the content is rated according to some
known set of criteria-providing information about the content.
Second, it presumes that someone-often the end user-has set
options (i.e., control) specifying the type of content that is al12. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 740 (1970)
(allowing the Post Office to implement mail patron requests to block mail
based on sender address).
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lowable, and that which is not. The operating mechanism of
the filtering system compares the rating applied to the content
with the options applicable to the user. Where the rating exceeds in some way the choices-perhaps by being too "adult" in
nature-the content is "blocked," usually by not being displayed on the user's screen or downloaded to the user's computer.
Obviously, the critical points in this framework for our
purposes are the ratings and the setting of options: this is
where the technology accepts human inputs. The comparison
between the rating and the options is merely an
"administrative" function performed by technology; the speed
and accuracy of the system make the widespread filtering feasible, but it is entirely controlled by the rating and option inputs.
Broadly speaking, there are two forms of ratings systems.
The first are database systems, which associate ratings with
13
particular content and store the rating-content information.
When a user requests a particular piece of content, her system
will contact the database, which will send back the corresponding rating. In contrast, an embedded ratings system uses
labels or tags within the content itself to transmit the corresponding rating. 14 The primary difference between the two
systems is who affixes the rating to a particular piece of content. In an embedded system, ratings are typically assigned
and entered by the content's creator, while in a database system the ratings for a vast array of content are created and
stored by a third party-that is, neither the end user nor creator. 15 The burgeoning commercial market for ratings products
13. Cyber Patrol, SurfWatch, CyberSitter, and X-Stop are all examples of
database-driven filtering software products. See, e.g., Cyber Patrol (visited
Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com>; Surfwatch (visited Oct. 16,
1998) <httpi//www.surfwatch.com>.
14. The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) is the best-known
example of an embedded system. See, e.g., Paul Resnik, FilteringInformation
on the Internet, SCI. Am., Mar. 1997, at 62.
15. This is primarily because the huge volume of content to be rated and
the difficulty of keeping the database system current virtually mandates
See Study: Search Engines Fall Short, CNET
spreading the costs.
NEWS.COM (Apr. 2, 1998) <http://news.com/News/Item0,4,20728,00.html>
(finding that even search engines index only a fraction of the web). Not all
database systems are run by third parties, however. The University of Michigan is demonstrating a database ratings system that will use ratings assigned
by the "community" using the ratings system. See PICS Application Incubator (visited Oct. 16, 1998) <http://krabappel.si.umich.edu/incubator/> ("Such a
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has fueled the growth of these third-party systems, most of
which sell access to a database, and even subscriptions to up6
dates.'
Problems with these database systems are well documented. 17 First, they are wildly overbroad and inaccurate, often blocking unexpected and useful content.18 Second, they
face an almost impossible task of keeping up with the tremendous volume and growth of the content on the Internet. 19 And
system uses embedded labels in combination with externally created ratings.").
16. For example, The Learning Company offers Cyber Patrol 4.0, a parental control software product, for $29.95. See Cyber PatrolFact Sheet (visited
Oct. 16, 1998) <http'//www.cyberpatroLcom/fact.htm>. Cyber Patrol uses a
CyberNOT and CyberYES list to allow users the option of blocking the content
on the CyberNOT list or limiting content to that on the CyberYES list. See id.
The lists are updated regularly by a "team of professionals... including parents and teachers." Id. Subscriptions to the updating service are an extra
charge. See id.
Of course, the ratings need not be assigned by humans. NetNanny is
software that scans the content of materials before it is displayed on a user's
screen. If the content matches words or phrases defined by the user to be disallowed, then the content will not be displayed. See Netnanny FAQ (visited
Dec. 10, 1998) <http:/www.netnanny.com/support/faq.htm>.
17. Declan B. McCullagh & Brock N. Meeks, Keys to the Kingdom,
CYBERWIRE DISPATCH (July 3, 1996) <http'//www.cyberwerks.com/cyberwire/
cwd/cwd.96.07.03.html>; Peacefire: Youth Alliance Against Censorship, Why
Peacefire Opposes Blocking Software (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www.
peacefire.org> [hereinafter Peacefire]; Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Faulty Filters: How Content FiltersBlock Access to Kid-Friendly Information
on the Internet (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http//www2.epic.org/reports/filterreport.html>.
18. For example, recent reports by the Censorware Project and Peacefire.org note that the highest-rated filtering software product, Cyber Patrol,
blocks the web sites of Planned Parenthood, Envirolink (an environmental
clearinghouse), the AIDS Authority, the MIT Project on Mathematics and
Computation, the University of Arizona, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction Engineering Research Laboratories. See Peacefire, supra
note 17; The Censorware Project, Blacklisted by Cyber Patrol:From Ada to
Yoyo (visited Dec. 23, 1997) <http'//www.spectacle.org/wp/ada-yoyo.html>;
see generally Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT.
L.J. 453 (1997).
19. A recent study of search engines concluded that (as of early 1998)
there are more than 320 million individual pages on the web alone. Study:
Search Engines Fall Short, supra note 15. By some accounts, the number of
pages on the web has been doubling every three to six months since 1993. See
Matthew Gray, Web Growth Summary (visited Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.
mit.edu/people/mkgray/nettweb-growth-summary.html>.
The database filtering systems could respond to this volume by assigning
ratings more generically-by rating an entire domain or host rather than individual web pages, for example. Of course, this only exacerbates the inaccuracy of the ratings. For example, Cyber Patrol has listed all pages at
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third, it is very difficult for the user to know what is being
blocked and why, because the creators of these systems consider the databases to be proprietary information, and their
20
contents are subject to the judgment of the people involved.
Database filtering systems are a coarse tool, and, while they
remain the most feasible technology available today, the more
refined embedded systems hold the promise of solving some of
the most persistent problems with rating systems.
B. EMBEDDED SYSTEMS: THE PLATFORM FOR INTERNET
CONTENT SELECTION (PICS)

Conceptually, an embedded ratings system seeks to solve
the major problems of the database systems by shifting the responsibility of rating content to the producer and transmitting
the rating with the content itself. Thus, an embedded system
wholly avoids the volume problem fundamental to the database systems. Further, by "labeling" or "tagging" each page or
"members.tripod.com" under the categories of "violence," "nudity," "sexual
acts," and "satanic/cult information." See The Censorware Project, supra note
18. That host is home to 1.4 million web pages, and while some of them
probably do have offensive material, most probably do not, and are blocked by
the program. See id.
20. Many of the filtering software programs denote specific criteria by
which they rate pages. For example, Cyber Patrol has a list of twelve categories of rated material: violence/profanity, partial nudity, full nudity, sexual
acts, gross depictions, intolerance, satanic/cult, drugs/drug culture, militant/extremist, sex education, questionable behavior or gambling, and alcohol
and tobacco. See Cyber Patrol, CyberNOT List Criteria(visited Oct. 16, 1998)
<http://www.cyberpatrol.com/cp-jist.htm>. Users of the software can choose
to block any or all of these rated categories.
The story of Solid Oak Software's CyberSitter is an enlightening example
of the ways that these databases can be abused. After Brock Meeks and Declan McCullagh wrote Keys to the Kingdom, a Cyberwire Dispatch story exposing the overbreadth of filtering software (including the fact that CyberSitter blocked the National Organization for Women for "sexual content"),
CyberSitter blocked the Cyberwire Dispatch site. The software still blocks the
site for Peacefire, a young persons' organization against online censorship
that contains material critical of filtering software, including CyberSitter. See
McCullagh & Meeks, supra note 17; Peacefire, supra note 17. Solid Oak Software has threatened to block all 2500 web sites hosted by Peacefire's provider
unless the provider removed the Peacefire site. Rebecca Vessel, CyberSitter
Goes After Teen, WIRED NEWS (Dec. 9, 1996) <http://www.wired.com.
news/story/901.html>. In 1997, it was revealed that CyberSitter's installation
software scanned the user's hard drive to determine whether the user had
visited the Peacefire web site, and would not install the software if it had. See
Brian McWilliams, CYBERsitter Filters Out Privacy, Says Anticensorship
Group, PC WORLD NEWSRADIO (July 2, 1997) <http://www.pcworld.com/
pcwtoday/article/0,1510,5006,00.html>.
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other element of content, the embedded system is neither under- nor overbroad. 21 And because producers rate their own
content as they create it, the rating system is comprehensive,
and the third-party effects noted above are not present.
The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) is a
standard for embedding rating labels within Internet content
developed by Paul Resnik of AT&T Research and James Miller
of MIT.22 PICS itself specifies little more than the syntax and
protocols used to label content and transmit the labels; it does
not itself specify a ratings system.23 The creators of PICS intend to enable other groups (or even individuals) to develop
their own rating schemes, using PICS as the underlying standard to ensure interoperability. 24 Thus, for example, any web
browser that is PICS-enabled would be able to use any of the
PICS-compatible ratings systems. A market might then develop for such ratings systems, allowing a diversity of ratings
systems as well as placing the choices regarding rating and
viewing content in the hands of the producers and users, respectively. As Resnik and Miller note:
Around the world, governments are considering restrictions on
on-line content. Since children differ, contexts of use differ, and values differ, blanket restrictions on distribution can never meet everyone's needs. Selection software can meet diverse needs, by blocking
reception, and labels are the raw materials for implementing contextspecific selection criteria. The availability of large quantities of labels will also lead to new sorting, searching, filtering, and organizing
tools that help users surf the Internet more efficiently.,

In many ways, the promises of PICS have been borne out.
A market of sorts has developed for the PICS-compatible ratings system; most of the major Internet-related companies
have announced support for PICS. Politicians and pundits
alike have endorsed the PICS approach to content regulation. 26
But PICS is not without its problems, both systemic and perceptual.

21. Unless, of course, the producer inaccurately classifies the content.
22. See Resnik & Miller, supra note 5.
23. See id. at 87.
24. See id. at 88.
25. Id. at 93.
26. See, e.g., A Family Friendly Internet (visited Oct. 16, 1998)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WHINew/Ratings/> ("On Wednesday, July 16,
President Clinton and Vice President Gore announced a strategy for making
the Internet 'family friendly.'").
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First, the enabling technology of PICS allows a whole new
dimension to social interaction: labeling that is standardized
and perfectly predictive, allowing labels to be ubiquitous. Labels have power, and PICS makes this power accessible. Not
only can one be the town crier, one can be the town censor as
well. Indeed, there is nothing that limits the scope of ratings
based on PICS, or who can implement them. While we often
think of ratings in terms of "adult" content, the PICS system
could just as effectively label content for subjective attributes
like "quality" or even label based on politics-such as
"republican" or "democrat," or "mainstream" or "radical." This
author even created a PICS rating system that allows rating
and selection based on the "stupidity" quotient of a particular
web page. 27 A corporation, a government, or an individual
could create a ratings system that labeled content that was
critical or embarrassing. Doni't like op-eds written by Rush
Limbaugh? Add a tag to your PICS system and block him out
from your screen (and from others who agree with you). Really
enjoy classical music? Then search for content with the classical music label and save yourself some time. The possibilities
are limited only by social creativity. At least in theory.
C. COORDINATION AND COOPERATION UNDER PICS
Here's the catch: PICS requires the cooperation of the producer of the content. If the population of web page producers
fail to see the wisdom in rating according to a particular system, or if they don't know about it, they will not embed the system's label, and the rating system will not cover their pages.
Similarly, if a producer misrates content, the rating system
will not be able to correct for it; you will get Rush Limbaugh
when you expected him to be blocked.
Some implementations of PICS take a step at addressing
this problem by allowing the user to choose the default response to an unrated page. For example, version 4.0 of Microsoft's Internet Explorer allows the user to check a box to choose
whether unrated pages can be seen.28 The implied threat of
opt-out by users will, in theory at least, encourage many commercial web sites to rate their pages according to the most
27. Through a very scientific observation process, I assure you.
28. See Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet (visited

Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.rsac.org/fra content.asp?onIndex=21> (instructing
parents how to activate the filter). The factory default setting is to allow unrated sites to be seen.
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popular rating services. 29 One can imagine that if PICS gains a
powerful following among the public, the pressure on producers
to label content will only increase. 30
For now, however, PICS faces a complex collective action
problem. The incentives to label content only gain meaning as
more people utilize PICS in the opt-out sort of way. But until
more content is labeled, most users will be loath to opt-out of
unrated content for fear of missing something important. 31 Although the "costs" to a producer of rating content according to
any particular ratings service are quite low-typically consisting of placing a single line in the HTML code of the pagemany producers may have political or other reasons to avoid
labeling.
Another important aspect of the PICS labeling system is
that just as it is neutral regarding the substance of the ratings
applied, the technology is neutral towards the location where
the filtering is achieved. Resnik and Miller conceive the filtering to take place on the end user's computer, allowing a high
degree of individual choice and customization. 32 But there is
no particular reason that the filtering could not take place at
some other level, such as at the user's Internet Service Provider (ISP), or the regional network access point (NAP). In
fact, any nodes between the user and the content server are potential filter-points, and the user may not even know about it.
Corporations or universities could filter their connection to the
wider Internet, 33 keeping internal users from accessing materials deemed inappropriate. ISPs could offer "upstream" PICS
filtering as a benefit to families; no need for parents to learn,
install, and configure any software. And, of course, govern29. Microsoft rates their pages according to the Recreational Software
Advisory Council (RSACi) system. See msn.com (visited Dec. 10, 1998) <http:
//home.microsoft.corn/>.
30. I suspect that this pressure will not be limited to commercial producers, but will extend to anyone who wishes to achieve the largest possible audience size. In order to "raise your voice" in cyberspace, it may become necessary to label it.
31. For example, Yahoo.com, the second most popular site on the net, is
presently unrated, as are Netscape.com, the third most popular site, the New
York Times, and others. See Media Metrix, Top New Media Results (visited
March 1998) <http'//www.npd.com/interact-mmnewmedia398.htm> (ranking
the popularity of web sites among users connecting from their homes).
32. See Resnik & Miller, supra note 5, at 91.
33. Stanford University, for example, routes most Internet traffic through
a computer named "sunet-gateway.stanford.edu," an obvious place for a filter.
Most corporations have similar set-ups.
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ments could filter content entering their territory to the extent
they controlled the points of entry.34 Placing labels on content,
although theoretically to facilitate individual selection of ratings, or what Justice O'Connor called "user-based zoning, 35
36
would be an incredibly effective tool for censorship.
D. PICS-ENABLED

RATINGS SYSTEMS: LABELING IN ACTION

The PICS-enabled ratings systems themselves bear some
consideration as well. One argument made in support of PICS
is that it will facilitate the growth of a marketplace of ratings
systems. Of course, it is vaguely unsettling to speak of content
blocking in this way; after all, this is Brandeis turned on his
head: a marketplace for anti-ideas, if you will.37 Nonetheless, it
is a powerful argument: the interoperability and ease-of-use of
the PICS-enabled systems will greatly reduce consumer "lockin," making the market for such systems more robust, and creating-in theory at least-a diversity of approaches to the rating and labeling issue.
In practice, it is difficult to determine whether the market
for anti-ideas is functioning smoothly. As of early summer
1998, it appears that there are six self-rating systems developed and several other third-party rating systems based on
PICS.38 By far the largest of these is sponsored by the Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet (RSACi).39 In
34. See Lessig, supra note 6, at 96. Control over access points is not a
trivial matter. New interconnections are springing up all the time; democratic governments at least would be hard pressed to keep up with this
growth.
35. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2354 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
36. See Garfinkel, supra note 7 ("Resnick and Miller have done a great job
designing a framework for censorship. I don't think I could have done it better myself.").
37. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there be time ... to avert the evil [flowing from speech] by the
process of education, the remedy to be applied is more free speech, not enforced silence."), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (per curiam).
38. See Paul Resnick, Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) (last
modified Jan. 3, 1998) <http://www.w3.org/PICS/>. PICS allows the embedded code to refer to another Internet site for the label rather than containing
the label itself. See id. This essentially turns the PICS system into a database system, as the external labels are typically assigned by a third party.
SurfWatch, Cyber Patrol, and NetSheperd are all examples of PICS-enabled
third-party rating systems. See id.
39. See About RSACi (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http'J/www.rsac.org~fra.
Content.asp?onIndex=1>.
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December 1997, RSACi claimed to have 50,000 pages of content
rated according to its system40 and comes pre-installed in all
versions of Microsofts Internet Explorer.4 1
Rating one's web site (or web page) according to the RSACi
system is free, and requires two basic steps: (1) answering a series of questions about the site, including contact information
and content description, at the RSACi home page; and (2) obtaining the snippet of rating code and pasting it into the HTML
code of the web page at issue. 42 Significantly, RSACi, by requiring the prospective rater to electronically affirm an agreement, retains "the right to audit and inspect the Rated Web
Site to confirm that Applicant's use of the Assigned Rating
meets the established standards" of use and specifically notes
the possibility of "corrective labeling."43
The RSACi rating comprises an assignment of "levels"
within four categories: nudity, sex, language, and violence.44
Each category allows five levels (numbered zero to four), and
each level has a defined meaning.45 For example, in the language category, level four is defined as "[c]rude, vulgar language or extreme hate speech," level three as "strong language
or hate speech," level two as "[m]oderate expletives or profanity," level one as "[m]ild expletives," and level zero as "[n]one of
the above." 46 After the user completes the questionnaire-and
40. See Recreational Software Advisory Council Rates Over 50,000 Web
Sites Free: Voluntary System Leads the Industry in Safeguardingthe Internet
for Children (visited Dec. 1, 1997) <http'//www.rsac.org/fraContent.asp?onIndex=73>.
41. See Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet, supra
note 28.
42. See Parents-How to Use RSACi (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http:/www.
rsac.org/frascontent.asp>.
43. See RSACi Terms & Conditions (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.
rsac.org/contentlregister/terms.htnml>. This at least raises the possibility that
RSACi will supplant a producer's judgment for its own, although I am unaware of any such circumstances where this has arisen.
44. See About RSACi, supra note 39.
45. See id.
46. Id. The terms used to describe the categories are further defined.
Thus, "mild expletives" are further described as: "The words hell and damn,
ass and horse's ass, BUT NOT asshole, assface, asswipe; butthead and
buttface BUT NOT butthole and buttwipe." Definitions for RSACi Language
Questions (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.rsac.org/content/register/def/
language.html>. The system's definition of "innocent kissing" (suitable for a
zero rating on the sex scale) is:
Any portrayal of humans or human-like creatures which a reasonable
person would consider as just kissing on lips (without touching of
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affirms the contract-she is presented with a line of computer
code which can be pasted into the web page. For example, the
RSACi code for my web page is:
<META http-equiv="PICS-Label" content='(PICS-1.1 "http://www.rsac.org/ratingsvOl.html" 1 gen true comment "RSACi North America
Server" on "1998.04.29T11:55-0800" r (n 0 s 0 v 010))'>

The "rating label" is designated by the numbers corresponding with the category letters. Therefore, in the example
above, the nudity level is zero, the sex level is zero, the violence
level is zero, and the language level is zero. In contrast, the
Playboy homepage's PICS label is:
<META http-equiv ="PICS-Label" content= ' (PICS-1.0 "http://www.
rsac.org/ratingsv01.html" 1 gen true comment "RSACi North America
Server" by "rodgerb@playboy.com" for "http://www.playboy.com" on
"1996.04.04T08:15-0500" r (n 4 s 3 v 014))'>47

Thus, Playboy has self-rated its site as having "[flrontal nudity," "[n]on-explicit sexual acts," no violence, and "[crude,
vulgar language or extreme hate speech."48 Browsers with options set at lower levels in any one of the four categories would
not load the Playboy web site but would be able to see my site.
H. FILTERS AS REGULATION: COORDINATION AND THE
NETWORK
The conceptual attractiveness of Internet content filters
and their limitations prompts discussion regarding the scope of
governmental involvement in their use. In their idealized
form, technological filters hold out the promise of a dynamic,
efficient, and effective means of screening content from minors
and unconsenting adults while retaining large measures of individual autonomy and choice.
But in late 1998, it seems unlikely that an idealized PICS
system will spring up soon without at least some form of government intervention. A relatively small number of pages are
tongues), head, shoulder, hands or arms, but not any other areas including but not limited to neck, breasts, torso, or legs. Innocent
kissing shows affection and/or love, but creates no reasonable perception of stronger sexual activity.
Definitions for RSACi Sex Questions (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.rsac.
org/content/register/def/sex.html>.
47. See Playboy Online (visited Oct. 21, 1998) <http://www.playboy.com>.
While the PICS ratings are normally invisible to the user, anyone can see the
ratings code (if any) of any page by selecting the "view source" function of the
web browser.
48. See About RSACi, supra note 39.
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actually rated according to a PICS rating scheme, and the
largest Internet browser manufacturer has not yet released a
PICS-enabled version of the software. 49 A PICS rating system
is perhaps the classic example of a good with strongly positive
network externalities-it is relatively valueless until increasing numbers of people use it, while its value increases rapidly
with the number of users. 50 At the present time, the cost and
effort of learning and implementing the PICS systems, 1 albeit
quite low, is unlikely to yield satisfactory returns without incentives.
The potential "costs" of easy access for children to pornographic materials, however, are significant. Even beyond the
difficult-to-quantify, although not insignificant, social costs of
children viewing indecent material, there is the very real perceptual problem caused by a public view of the Internet as the
home of little more than what have been described as the 'Four
Horsemen of the Infocalypse": pedophiles, terrorists, drugdealers, and money launderers. 52 This negative perception
could limit the Internet's growth as a mainstream commercial
and communications network, restraining the growth of an
emerging sector of the economy.53 Lower growth in the increasingly important Internet industry might raise the spectre
of market failure, providing incentives for government intervention. And the politics of the underlying issue is likely to
further energize regulation: protecting children is a powerful,
bipartisan issue, and the Four Horsemen have few friends in
government.

49. See id.
50. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICRO-

ECONOMICS 118-20 (3d ed. 1995) ("The Bandwagon Effect"). The argument, as
made above, is that as more users enable the PICS rating systems on their
computers (and some percentage of these choose to opt-out of unrated sites),
the benefit to the producer of self-rating will increase. As the number of rated
sites increase, the value of PICS-to both the user and the producerincreases rapidly, encouraging even more use.
51. This applies to either producer/raters or users/choosers, though the
costs are especially low for the users.
52. Wendy Grossman, Signs of Insecurity in Cyberspace, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 2, 1998, at 13.

53. The U.S. Government advanced a version of this argument in Reno v.
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), as an additional and "equally significant" interest to that of protecting children. Id. at 2351. The Court found the argument
to be "singularly unpersuasive" as a countervailing interest to free speech. Id
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Therefore, the time seems ripe for additional government
involvement in facilitating the screening of Internet content. 54
The balance of this paper will attempt to describe the permissible scope of the government's activities in relation to the new
fitering technologies.
A couple of initial observations may be useful here. First,
whatever the government does, it will not have to do very
much. PICS, as with all Internet standards, is likely to achieve
strong growth due to positive network externalities. The key
will be to get it started; a little "push" may be all that is needed
to create the self-generating cycle of growth: the ratings become more valuable to users and the creation of ratings becomes more valuable to producers (and vice-versa).
Second, the ratings system chosen in the beginning may
stick with us. A ratings system that makes strong initial gains
will likely benefit from the network effects to the detriment of
competitor systems. Users and producers alike will be attracted to the higher value system, which may be difficult to
dislodge once it has gained widespread acceptance. This path
dependence implies that the "market" for competing rating systems may disappear as PICS itself takes hold, with an initial
large player becoming the standard.55 Therefore, the implications of government involvement may, as a result of the economics of networks, loom larger than ordinary direct regulation. The stakes seem quite high.
I. DIRECT OR IMPOSED FILTERING
As an initial cut at the issue, the Federal, state, or local
government could simply filter Internet content itself or force
the fitration of all Internet content by third parties, such as
ISPs or backbone carriers. 56 For example, a state could pass
legislation that would enable it to filter and block all material
deemed harmful to minors either using PICS or-as is more
54. Reno v. ACLU left intact part of the Communications Decency Act, 47
U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. 1997), prohibiting the knowing transmission of obscene
messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.
Ct. at 2340; see also A Family Friendly Internet, supra note 26 (noting that
the decision in Reno v. ACLU "did not affect U.S. laws against obscenity, child
pornography, and on-line stalking").
55. At this juncture, all indications are that the RSACi is well-positioned
in this regard. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 597-99 (1998).
56. Backbone carriers are primarily large telecommunications concerns
that carry the bulk of Internet traffic between major interconnection points.
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likely given the current state of the technology-by installing a
database rating system. This statute is almost certainly unconstitutional.
A. THE GENERAL CASE
Either the producer whose content was blocked or the user
who was denied access would have standing to challenge the
statute. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court appears to have
foreclosed any analogy between the Internet and broadcasting
where content-based intervention is permissible.57 Thus, a filtering-blocking scheme of this sort is a paradigmatic contentbased regulation, singling out sexually-related speech, and
would be subject to strict scrutiny. 8 The government would
have to show a compelling state interest supporting the filters
and that the filters are the least restrictive means to achieve
the ends.5 9 While the protection of children from harmful materials has been held by the Court to be significant, even compelling,6 0 the Court has also held that "that interest does not
justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed
to adults."61 Because government-imposed filtering would apply regardless of the age of the end user, this law would be held
unconstitutional.
Any attempt to limit the filtering and blocking to material
deemed "obscene" under the Miller test 62 is unlikely to save the
statute. While obscenity is unprotected speech, 63 the ratings
system itself is probably not precise enough to avoid sweeping
in protected speech.6 4

57. 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
58. See id. at 2329; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
59. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118.
60. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
61. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
62.

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).

The Miller test

looks at three factors to determine whether or not material is obscene. The
factors are "(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. (citations omitted).
63. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
64. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Finally, because the filtering and blocking takes place before the material even reaches the "blocked" users, the law
might be characterized as a form of prior restraint, and thus
come before the courts with a "heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity."65 In this regard, the unique procedural
aspects of the filtering-blocking system would be significant.
The Supreme Court has allowed some prior restraints when
the "administration" of the restraints places the burden on the
government and allows a rapid appeal to the judiciary.66 In
this circumstance, however, this "safe harbor" would not apply:
although the operative "burdens" of the system are unclear, 67
the technology does not contemplate an appeal to the judiciary.68

B. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF LIBRARIES
One context in which the government filtering issue has
arisen is public access Internet terminals in public libraries
and public school libraries. 69 In MainstreamLoudoun v. Board
of Trustees,70 one of the first filtering cases to be litigated, the
government argued for the constitutionality of a public library's filtering scheme by analogizing it to the selection of library books in Board of Education v. Pico.71 In Pico, the Supreme Court held that a school board's removal of several
books from a school library was unconstitutional in light of the
"right to receive ideas [as] a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and
65. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam); see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
66. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
67. In one sense, the technology places the burden upon the speaker, as
she will have to conform the speech to the rubric of the filtering system.
However, in Freedman, the Court noted the tendency for bureaucratic overreach as the animating purpose behind the burden shifting. See id. at 57-58.
Here the technology, of course, is perfectly consistent. And finally, the fact
that the filtering system is fixed and preexisting means that the speaker has
an immobile target at which to aim; she will be able to perfectly tailor her
speeih to meet the filter.
68. The volume of content and speed at which it gets filtered would themselves be significant impediments to appeal.
69. See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, In Rejecting Dismissal of Filtering Case,
Judge Sets High Standard for Libraries,N.Y. TIMES (CYBERTIMES) (April 9,
1998) <http'J/www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/04cyber/articles/091ibrary.html>.
70. 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998).
71. See Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793; see also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853 (1982).
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political freedom."72 The Court specifically noted, however,
that its ruling did not affect "the discretion of a local school
board to choose books to add to the libraries of their schools."73
Seizing upon this language, the Loudoun County Library argued that filtering net content was akin to selecting books to
add to their collection or to receive through an inter-library
loan system and thus, under the Court's precedent, that the
"First Amendment does not in any way limit the decisions of a
public library on whether to provide access to information on
the Internet."74 The Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia found this reasoning unpersuasive because
of the nature of the Internet as a "single, integrated system"75
and because the plaintiffs in Pico were schoolchildren. 76
But this may not be a complete view of the issue. A close
look at the doctrine and the technology shows that whether a
library may filter and block Internet content will turn upon the
"fit" between the state interests and the implementation of the
filtering technology itself, although in two different ways.
First, the government can attack the characterization of its
use of filtering technology as content-based regulation. In Renton v. Playtime Theatres,77 the Court noted that where the
72. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.
73. Id. at 871.
74. Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
75. Id. at 793 (citation omitted). First Amendment advocates will be wise
to avoid hanging too much on this factual distinction. Certainly the Internet
can be viewed as an undifferentiated whole-a system of computer networks
using the same sets of protocols and allowing ready access to any part of the
system from any other. But the net can just as easily be viewed with slightly
more granularity, as a "vast library including millions of readily available and
indexed publications," according to the Supreme Court. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.
Ct. 2329,2335 (1997). This line of factual argument is also vulnerable to what
Justice O'Connor described in her dissent in Reno v. ACLU as "gateway" technology-which "construct[s] barriers in cyberspace" between content. Id at
2353-54. The technology of the net is changing so rapidly that viewing it as an
undifferentiated whole is likely to become increasingly inapt as filtering and
other "gateway" technologies become more widespread and effective.
76. See Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 795. The Supreme Court has long held
that the state has special interests in controlling the operation and curriculum of schools and even in "inculcating fundamental values" in schoolchildren.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 864; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court has also found that those
under the age of majority have less First Amendment rights than adults. See
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
77. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Court in Renton found the government interest in zoning regulations to be "substantial," and the zoning itself to be effective. See id at 50-5L
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regulation was intended to cure the "secondary effects" of the
speech-in that case, to avoid the crime and reduction of property values caused by adult theaters-it was not content-based,
but rather a time, place, and manner regulation subject to
something like intermediate scrutiny. 78 In the library context,
the government could argue that the imposition of filters was
intended to cure the "secondary effects" of the display of indecent material: a reduction in library traffic, the introduction of
a "rougher crowd" into the library's patrons, and a general devaluing of the "quality" of the library.79 This argument, however, is limited by Boos v. Barry, which noted that the reaction
of the listener cannot be a secondary effect under Renton, implying that the government could not advance the protection of
80
children as a rationale and still fit within a Renton analysis.
The Boos limitation may be dispositive, since although the Supreme Court has not clarified a means to distinguish a regulation targeted at secondary effects from one that is contentbased, courts are likely-as a factual matter-to view efforts to
filter Internet content as content-based.81 But even if the government is able to convince a court that the filtering is legitimately based on a concern about secondary effects, it must still
"fit" between filters and the secondary effects is
show that the
82
reasonable.
78. See id.
79. In Renton, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted the prevention of crime, the protection of the city's retail trade, and the quality of urban
life as the secondary effects. See id. at 48.
80. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (noting that the desire to
prevent "psychological damage" was targeted at the direct effects of the
speech, not secondary effects).
81. Professor Tribe argues that laws seen by the courts as related to
"communicative impact" will receive strict scrutiny, while those that relate to
"non-communicative impact" will not. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 790 (2d ed. 1988). Of course, differentiating between the two is not trivial. See John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration:
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975) (arguing that the distinction between communication-based restrictions and non-communication-based restrictions is difficult to discern). Given the Supreme Court's strong support
for the Internet as a medium for free speech, one suspects that courts will
look askance at arguments that content regulation on this medium are directed solely at "non-communicative impact." See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct.
2329, 2544 (1997) ("[Our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.").
82. Though the required "fit" under the time, place and manner intermediate scrutiny test is not stringent, it is non-zero. The physical "screening-off"
of the Internet access computers from other patrons could be viewed as a far
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If the Renton argument fails, the level of scrutiny applied
will then depend upon the breadth of the filters. If the library
purports to limit access to only the unprotected categories of
obscene or child pornographic materials as defined by New
York v. Ferberand Miller, then it need only show a rational basis for the filtering scheme and a reasonable fit between the interests and the filters. 83 If, however, the library extends beyond the truly unprotected categories of speech into indecency
or vague "harmful to minors" standards, the filtering will have
to be justified by a compelling state interest and be narrowly
tailored to that interest. 84 A state's interest in protecting children from indecent speech is substantial, but Reno v. ACLU
held that "that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad
suppression of speech addressed to adults."85 The Court explained that, "Regardless of the strength of the government's
interest in protecting children, the level of discourse... simply
cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for
[children]."86 Therefore, it seems that the library would have to
bifurcate filtered access to the net between children and adults.
Filtering on the adult terminals would be limited to obscenity
and child pornography, while filtering on the children's terminals would be somewhat less circumscribed, although probably
limited to sexual material of the form discussed in Ginsbergv.
New York.87 In both cases, however, a crucial issue will be the
"fit" of the filtering technology; as was noted in the discussions
more effective (and speech-neutral) method for reducing secondary effects in
the library.
83. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765-66 (1982) (holding that obscene material is not entitled to First Amendment protection); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (holding that restrictions on obscene materials
receive rational basis review). Of course, if the filtering technology in fact
sweeps broader than the library policy indicates, then courts should read the
parameters of the technology as the de facto library policy.
84. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) (applying strict scrutiny review to broad restrictions on adult speech designed to protect minors);
Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 2 F. Supp. 2d. 783, 793 (1988)
(statutes restricting speech harmful to minors receive strict scrutiny review).
85. 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
86. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75
(1983)).
87. 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) ("[The concept of obscenity or of unprotected
matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is
directed or from whom it is quarantined."). Importantly, a public school library may have even more latitude to filter, as content selection within school
libraries has been upheld to be permissible when grounded upon legitimate
pedagogical purposes. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982).
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above, the present crop of database ratings systems in particular are subject to unpredictably large overbreadth and may
88
be subject to challenge on that basis. Given the present state
of the technology and current First Amendment doctrine, it is
likely that public libraries will be severely constrained, if permitted at all, in their ability to broadly filter Internet content.
The significance of this analysis, however, is that it reveals
the importance of the evolution of filtering technology. Filters
with more accuracy and precision-that is, filters that confidently allow blocking closely limited to unprotected or underprotected content-will change the landscape of this analysis.
The revolution of PICS may change the ability of the government to constitutionally regulate Internet content. Therefore,
it is next necessary to consider what the state may permissibly
do with respect to PICS.
IV. "INDIRECT" REGULATION: THE SUPPORT OF
INTERNET LABELING
Since constitutional limitations on the government's power
to impose direct filtering will decrease as the technology becomes more sophisticated, the government may attempt to influence the development of filtering technologies. Specifically,
the government might consider the growth of a label system
like PICS to be an important precursor to further content
regulation on the Internet. As noted above, once widespread
labeling is in place, users would place increasing value on the
ability to filter out unwanted content, leading to increasing in-

88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Reno v. ACLU, 117
S. Ct. at 2344-45; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (holding that
overbroad statutes are unconstitutional); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
462 (1958) (holding that the government regulation must fit the intended
ends). The current scope of the overbreadth doctrine is uncertain. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Court noted that regulations will
be invalidated on overbreadth grounds only if "substantially overbroad in relation to the statutes plainly legitimate purpose." Id. at 622. And in Brockett
v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491 (1985), the Court held that a statute susceptible to a narrowing construction will not be held overbroad on the basis of a
broader construction. See id. at 509. In the filtering and blocking case, courts
will have ample evidentiary material to consider the quantitative approach of
Broadrick,though the line between substantial and insubstantial overbreadth
is not at all clear. Brockett, on the other hand, seems inapplicable, since the
technological filter at issue is resistant to alternative constructions, broader
or narrower.
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centives to label independent of the government mandate. 89
The next part will consider some possible approaches the government may take to stimulate the growth of PICS and their

constitutional validity.

A. MANDATORY RATINGS OR LABELING
An obvious way to support the growth of a PICS labeling
system is to mandate it. The government could pass a statute
directly requiring the labeling of Internet content according to
the PICS standard and back up such a labeling requirement
with fraud penalties for misrating. 90
First, a note about an important distinction. As will be
seen below, it is important at the outset to recognize the critical difference between mandating the labeling and mandating
the labeling accordingto a designated ratings system. The latter is a classic content-based restriction on speech: the government is distinguishing among categories of speech according to content. A claim of impartiality across the established
categories will not save the statute, as the government certainly will not endorse or authorize the unprotected categories
of speech extant in the ratings system. Mandatory labeling according to a defined ratings system brings the facts much
closer to a prescribed orthodoxy than to government neutrality.91
But the government's objective-the growth of (private)
regulation of content-may well be served by either form of
89. This suggests that the government could anticipate the positive network externalities associated with labeling by requiring less than all of the
net content to be rated. For example, all commercial content could be required to be rated, creating less of a regulatory burden and decreasing some
First Amendment impact.
90. Senator Patty Murphy announced in late summer 1997 that she
would introduce legislation making the misrating of sites criminally punishable. See Danny Westneat, Senator Murray's Internet Controls Draw Fire,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 15, 1997, at A12. To date, however, no such legislation
has been introduced on a national level. Because the fraud penalties are contingent upon the underlying question of whether the government may directly
coerce labeling of content, they are beyond the scope of this paper. I mention
them simply to denote some enforcement mechanism that would get at a crucial problem with self-rating systems: misrating.
91. Compare West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
633-34 (1943) (striking down mandatory flag salutes as promoting a government orthodoxy) with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (upholding disclosure requirements as the "least restrictive means" of supporting the government's significant-but politically neutral-anti-corruption interests).
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regulation. Mandating labeling according to sexual content, for
example, even without specifying the "levels" or granularity of
the ratings system, will in essence jumpstart the market for
ratings systems. Politicians are likely to be happy with any
rating system that allows parents to filter out unwanted sexual
content, and savvy legislators are likely to realize that the
market may produce a more useful system over time than they
may create through legislation. In any event, the government
gets what it wants: the enablement of private-probably homebased-content regulation. Directly specifying the ratings system along with mandating the labeling is probably not necessary to encourage the spread of this technology, and avoiding
this step will reduce the constitutional concerns of the measure.92 Therefore, legislators considering this constitutional difficulty will likely choose a labeling statute that does not establish a ratings system.
But even a statute that does not establish a ratings system
may be constitutionally vulnerable on several grounds. First,
and most directly, producer-speakers could bring a First
Amendment claim on the grounds that the mandatory labeling
is compelled speech. Second, a related attack would be that
the scheme compels the speaker-producers to associate with
the ratings system, and therefore is a violation of the right
against compelled association. A third approach would be to
challenge the ratings themselves as not narrowly tailored to
their purpose, either due to vagueness, overbreadth or both.
Finally, Professor Lessig has argued that the imposition of a
PICS system would be unconstitutional on the grounds that in
choosing a broader filtering scheme than necessary-that is, by
forcing PICS labeling rather than limiting the access of children to indecent speech-the government exceeds its constitutional authority to regulate Internet content.9 3 However, as I
demonstrate in this section, as long as the government involvement remains substantially indirect, the PICS-enforcing
statute is likely to be constitutional.

92. As I describe more fully below, this is primarily because "avoiding the
details" appears to exploit the crucial public-private distinction. See infra
notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
93. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 665-69.
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1. The Compelled Speech Attack
The mandatory labeling of Internet content could be attacked by a producer on the basis that the attachment of labels
constitutes compelled speech. The Supreme Court has held
that the right not to speak is within the protections of the First
Amendment. 94 The right against compelled speech, however, is
not complete. Specifically, the Court has recognized that the
government may not force citizens to speak its own views,95 to
make financial disclosures without a sufficient government interest, 96 to speak in a way that is ideologically hateful to the
individual, 97 to speak when speech would create a realistic
chance of reprisal, 98 or to include additional speech that would
alter the content of the speaker's message. 99 On the other
hand, the Court has allowed compelled speech where it "better
enable[s] the public to evaluate" the speech without causing
additional misunderstandings,I 00 where it causes little burden,101 or where the government interests are "sufficiently important" and implemented by the least restrictive means.102 In
addition, the Federal government has a panoply of regulations
which compel speech, such as the FDA's regulations regarding

94. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995)
(state cannot require individuals to identify themselves in campaign literature); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (striking
down requirement that charities reveal the percentage of their funds spent on
charitable activities); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (state cannot require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideologically hateful message); Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974)
(state cannot force a newspaper editor to publish editorial responses); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 (compulsory flag salutes are unconstitutional).
95. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
96. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 798.
97. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1986) (striking down requirement that public utility place third-party newsletter in mailings to customers).
98. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 379.

99. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 559 (1995) (holding that parade organizers had no obligation to allow an ideologically opposed organization in their parade).
100. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987) (holding that the state
can compel the placement of a "political propaganda" label on foreign films).
10L See id. (holding forced speech constitutional where it places no burden
on speaker).
102. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1986) (holding that the government's interest in appearance of a proper political process is a substantial interest that outweighs certain First Amendment values). This is generally
considered to be strict scrutiny.
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food and drug information and labeling, or mandatory disclosure under Federal Securities laws. 0 3
a. No Burden to FirstAmendment Rights: The Keene and
Wileman Bros. Analysis
The case most factually analogous to a govermnent-imposed
labeling scheme is Meese v. Keene, in which Keene, a distributor,
challenged a regulation requiring labeling of material deemed
by the State Department to be "political propaganda."1°4 Keene
challenged the labeling primarily on the basis that the addition
of a label to the material-in that case, films-would decrease
the demand because of the pejorative connotation of the term
"political propaganda." 105 The Supreme Court, however, held
five to three that the addition of the mandatory label "place[ed]
no burden on protected expression."10 6 Rather, the Court
103. While I am unaware of any challenge to these compelled speech
schemes on First Amendment grounds, these regulations may be less constitutionally questionable because they deal with commercial speech, and-at
least in the case of the FDA regulations-the labels are affixed to products
rather than to speech. In this sense, Glickman v. Wileman Bros., 117 S. Ct.
2130 (1997), is instructive. In Wileman Bros., the Court found that compelled
subsidies for generic fruit advertising did not burden First Amendment rights,
and instead evaluated the program "under the standard appropriate for the
review of economic regulation." Id- at 2138.
104. 481 U.S. at 468. That the underlying speech in Keene was of foreign
origin (foreign films) does not make the case any less analogous. In the compelled speech context, the First Amendment right is that of the editor (i.e., the
individual wishing to not speak), not necessarily the original producer of the
material. See, e.g., Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(discussing First Amendment rights of editors). So in Keene, the asserted
First Amendment right was that of the distributor, an American citizen. 481
U.S. at 467, 474 (describing Keene as an attorney, member of the California
State Legislature, and citizen). Indeed, the Court in Keene explicitly compared the rights at issue to those presented in Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965), and Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), cases involving both domestic
"editors" and domestic speech. See Keene, 481 U.S. at 475-76, 481-82. Finally,
there is no hint in the language or reasoning of the Keene opinion that the origin of the underlying speech was given any weight whatsoever.
105. Keene, 481 U.S. at 468-69.
106. Id. at 480. At least one commentator has suggested that Keene is irreconcilable with Riley's "broad language" supporting strict scrutiny for compelled speech. See Chris Kelly, The Spectre of a "Wired'Nation: Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC and First Amendment
Analysis in Cyberspace, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 559, 636 (1997); see also Lessig, supra note 8, at 662 n.95. But the cases can simply be harmonized by recognizing that the Court-in all such cases-first determines whether the
compelled speech "burdens protected expression." Keene, 481 U.S. at 480.
While the Court has noted that compelled speech is as constitutionally ques-
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stated that "by compelling some disclosure of information and
permitting more [Congress] simply required the disseminators
of such material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda."'107 Additionally, the Court found the term "political
propaganda" to be a 'broad, neutral [term] rather than a pejorative one."' 08
Whether the standard applied in Keene or the more traditional doctrine of compelled speech would apply to the PICSenforcing statute will turn largely upon whether the speakerproducer can demonstrate a burden on protected expression. 09
The government would describe Keene as broadly holding that
merely requiring the labeling of speech does not burden free
expression, and would argue that the enforced labeling of Internet content via a PICS label would be even less troublesome
than the labeling in Keene, since the label itself is normally
readable only by computers.
The challenger's response would be two-fold. First, she
could demonstrate the negative impact of a particular PICS la-

tionable as speech regulation, the Court reaches this point after determining
that the compulsion of speech was as burdensome as direct speech regulation.
See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256. In Wooley and Barnette, the burden on protected speech was the attempt to promote government orthodoxy (and perhaps thereby drown out other views). See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
715 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42
(1943). In Pacific Gas and Tornillo, the burden was much more direct: that
the right of response was triggered on the basis of earlier speech meant that
the speaker would be chilled from uttering some types of speech. See Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S 1, 18 (1986); Tornillo, 418
U.S. at 257. And in McIntyre, the chilling effect from the possibility of reprisal was an unquestionable burden. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 379-80 (1995). In contrast, the Court in Wileman Bros. found
that the plaintiffs' "criticisms of generic advertising provide no basis for concluding that the factually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgement of
anybody's right to speak freely." 117 S.Ct. at 2139-40. And while it is quite
possible to argue against the Wileman Bros. and Keene decisions on this basis,
the Court's unifying theme appears to be that the compelled speech must burden in some sense the concomitant rights of speech. Id. at 2138. Therefore, in
order to raise a First Amendment compelled speech claim, a challenger must
show a causal link between the compelled speech and a burden on protected
expression.
107. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-81 (1987).
108. Id. at 483. The Court also noted the "respect" for Congress's power to
define the terms that it uses in legislation. Id.at 484. Because the term was
defined neutrally in the statute, and had been widely used without challenge,
the Court would not attribute a negative meaning. See id.
109. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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bel.11 0 By labeling content as sexually explicit, the producer
would be demonstrably excluding potential audience members-those who use computers with filter options to block
sexually explicit material. This is unlike the vague "pejorative
connotation" alleged in Keene. Here there is a demonstrated
reduction in audience size. Moreover, the Court in Keene noted
that the speaker could counteract any negative connotation towards the film by attaching additional labels or explanations."' In the PICS case, this is not possible-the label triggers the blocking mechanism before there is any opportunity to
even view the content, and PICS does not allow "explanatory"
material in addition to ratings. Second, the speaker-producer
could note the "burdens" associated with the labeling itself,
and
specifically that the cost in time and effort to determine
112
program the label might dissuade further production.
How this factual "burden" determination will turn out is
anyone's guess. But it is also irrelevant. Whether Keene applies or not will determine only the level of scrutiny applied;
under Keene and Wileman Bros., the Court-applying rational
basis review-would merely determine whether the law is rationally related to the asserted interests, which it almost certainly is.113 But as I discuss below, there is reason to believe
that the PICS-enforcing statute would survive intermediate
and even strict scrutiny.

110. Ideally, there would be empirical evidence to demonstrate how many
potential audience members were lost due to a particular rating, such as for

"sexual activity."

11L See Keene, 481 U.S. at 481.
112. In American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), one long time Internet expert testified that he tried to imbed PICScompliant labels in his online newsletter site but finally gave up after several
hours. See Testimony cited in ACLU, Fahrenheit451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning? (visited Oct. 20, 1998) <http'//www.aclu.orgissues/cyber/burning.html>.
This is distinct from the author's experience, where a web page was labeled
within fifteen minutes and with minimal effort.
113. The only possible question is whether the PICS statute is likely to be
at all effective. Given the low level of rationality review, however, it seems
highly likely that Congress would be given the benefit of the doubt. See
Glickman v. Wileman Bros, 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2152 (1997) (holding that regulation of economic activity "is plainly permissible short of something so arbitrary as to fail the rational basis test").
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b. Intermediate Scrutiny: The Content-Neutralityof a PICS
Statute
If the hypothetical statute is drawn broadly enough to require that all Internet speech be labeled rather than singling
out any particular speech for labeling, then the statute looks
quite similar on its face to the "content-neutral" provisions
given intermediate scrutiny in Turner Broadcasting v. FCC.114
In Turner, the Court found that the requirement that cable
television networks carry certain broadcast signals "did not
burden or benefit speech of a particular content,"' 5 and upheld
the laws under the O'Brien test.116 In the PICS-enforcement
case, the statute on its face applies equally to all speech posted
on Internet web pages. It does not discriminate according to
content. The fact that it focuses only on Internet-based speech,
the argument goes, does not justify strict scrutiny under the
Court's precedent.17
The challenger's primary response to this argument is that
by forcing labeling according to the content of speech, the
114. 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994). At issue in Turnerwere a series of "must
carry" provisions that forced cable companies to carry local commercial and
public broadcast stations. The Court upheld these provisions. See id.
115. Id. at 645.
116. Id. at 662. Content-neutral regulations that impose an "incidental"
burden on speech are analyzed according to intermediate scrutiny. See
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see also Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989). So-called "time, place, and manner"
regulations are also analyzed in this mode. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). Under O'Brien, a contentneutral regulation will be upheld if.
"[11 it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [2] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and [3] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest." 391 U.S. at 377 (numbering added). The significant analysis
of the O'Brien test is primarily part [2]; the Court has not closely followed the
"no greater than essential" restriction in part [3]. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 299.
117. "It would be error to conclude.., that the First Amendment mandates strict scrutiny for any speech regulation that applies to one medium (or
a subset thereof) but not others." Turner, 512 U.S. at 660. Instead, the Court
has held that such media discrimination will only raise serious constitutional
questions in certain circumstances, such as when it targets a small number of
speakers, and is justified when the differential treatment is based on the special characteristics of the medium being regulated. See id. (citing Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Conm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)). Here, the
Internet contains a very large number of speakers and the pervasiveness, ease
of access, and difficulty of public regulation probably avoids the discriminatory concern.
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PICS-enforcing statute is ipso facto content-based.11 8 This is a
difficult position, because-if the statute is carefully-drawnCongress will leave the ratings and rating systems wholly up
to private parties. The fact that the statute might require all
web pages to be rated is probably not enough to raise contentbased questions, because the regulation applies to all web
pages, regardless of the specific content. The burden of rating
will be the same on all speakers. 119 If the challengers could
show that the "burden" of the PICS-enforcing statute applied
differently to different types of speech-say by introducing factual findings that labels indicating high sexual or violent content would reduce traffic or stigmatize the speakers-the argument gains some force. Although the Court rejected this
argument in Keene on factual grounds,12 0 it appears to have accepted it to some degree in Riley.121 But, in the case of PICS,
the government has the powerful response that all particulars
of the compelled speech-the individual "levels" of the ratings
system, for example-are controlled by private parties. The
compelled speech is not "triggered" by a particular message1 22

118. Professor Lessig, drawing support from some of the Court's language
in Riley, makes the more direct claim that compelled speech is inherently content-based. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 662 n.95. This conclusion, if it was
ever applicable to the facts of Riley-and I doubt it was-certainly did not
survive Turner,where the Court not only described Riley as content-based in
application-noting that the basis of the Riley holding was that "solicitation of
funds trigger[ed a] requirement to express [a] government-favored message"-but also proceeded to analyze the "compelled speech" must-carry provisions as content-neutral regulations meeting intermediate scrutiny. 512
U.S. at 655.
119. To be fair to Professor Lessig, he appears to be analyzing a statute
that would require rating only of what he calls "Ginsberg speech"-speech
from which the government has a legitimate interest in protecting children.
See Lessig, supra note 8, at 657-69. A statute only requiring labeling of pages
with a significant degree of sexual content is plainly content-based; my point
is that a relatively minor change in the statute leads to a very different result
and is probably as likely to occur, given the advantages.
120. The Court simply did not accept that the application of a
"propaganda" label would "have actually had any adverse impact on the distribution" of the materials. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 483-84 (1987).
121. The Court noted that in the context of fundraising, the compelled disclosure of financial overhead percentages "could encourage or discourage the
listener from making a... donation [and] would clearly and substantially
burden the protected speech." Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S.
781, 798 (1988). Admittedly, on this point, Riley and Keene are difficult to
square.
122. Cf. Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S 1 (1986).
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and is not determined by the government.1 23 Indeed, the latter
point makes the PICS-enforcing statute appear further attenuated from the government-mandated-and-written labels upheld
in Keene, and perhaps even less questionable.
Given the present doctrine, whether the PICS-enforcing
statute is considered content-neutral will likely turn on the interests at issue. That is, the central question is whether the
government's enablement or support of private/individual
regulation (even censorship) is related to the suppression of
free expression. The key to this analysis is to recall that the
"interests related to the suppression of free expression" must be
those of the government rather than those of private parties.
With this fact in mind, the government could put forth at least
two plausible content-neutral governmental interests to explain its action.
i. market-facilitation: the analogy to Turner Broadcasting

In Turner, the Court held that "assuring that the public
has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order."'124 A similar argument
might be made in favor of the PICS-enforcing statute, specifically that the imposition of "must-rate" rules, like the "mustcarry" rules in Turner, are necessary to ensure the continued
growth of a diversity of voices on the Internet. 125 In this way,
123. Cf Riley, 487 U.S. at 798.
124. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994). I must admit
that it seems a bit odd to talk of interests in "diversity" as content-neutral.
Certainly diversity interests are not content-specific, but they seem to imply
an interest in the different, an interest in anything not currently available,
which seems less than wholly agnostic.
125. Relatedly, Turner's finding that the importance of local broadcasting
outlets themselves "can scarcely be exaggerated," may support a claim that
the growth of the Internet itself would be a sufficiently important contentneutral basis for imposing self-rating. See id. at 663 (citing United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968); see also Reno v. ACLU, 117
S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997) (noting the great communicative virtues of the Internet). However, inReno v. ACLU, the Court noted that this argument assumes
that "the unregulated availability of [unwanted content] is driving countless
citizens away from the medium because of the risk of exposing themselves or
their children to harmful material." 117 S. Ct. at 2351. Certainly the continued growth of the Internet seems to repudiate the idea that any stifling is occurring. There are debates about the most appropriate measure of the "size"
of the Internet (and therefore the size), but nobody seems to think that the
growth rate is slowing. See, e.g., Jamie Murphy, It's Not the Size that Counts,
But How You Measure It, N.Y. TIMEs (CYBERTIMES) (visited June 5, 1998)
<http:// www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/07/cyber/articles/05big.html>. Note,
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the claim would be one of market failure: that the lack of Congressional action in response to the content control problem
will lead to migration towards poor second-best solutions that
will restrict the diversity of voices in much the same way as
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Turner's cable
television regulations.
The most plausible "second-best" solutions to the contentcontrol problem that may emerge in the absence of government
regulation are combinations of both convergence on verticallyintegrated ISPs and pervasive third-party censorship. Vertically-integrated ISPs are those which produce and maintain
their own content as well as provide access to the wider Internet. A familiar example of this is America Online (AOL), the
most-used ISP in the world, which provides members access to
the Internet, to its own proprietary content, and to "chat" areas.12 6 A plausible source of AOL's popularity among new Internet users is its commitment to content control-AOL limits
content within its proprietary area and provides blocking
services for Internet content. In addition, AOL gains significant revenue from advertising, merchandising, and other content-related sources.12 7 In this sense, AOL produces content,
much like a local television broadcaster. But AOL is also a
service provider, akin to a cable operator. As the Court noted
in Turner, vertical integration would encourage providers to
drop some broadcasters and to favor affiliated programmers. 128
Similarly, AOL will have little incentive to include others' content for the benefit of its members and may even have strong
incentives to block members' access to outsiders' content in an

however, that time could change this conclusion: it is plausible that the Internet might not reach its potential as a widespread commercial and communicative medium without some way to allay the fears of those concerned about the
availability of inappropriate materials. For example, the manipulation of
popular Internet "search engine" results by pornographic web sites is an issue
likely to resonate with those considering whether to connect to the Internet.
See, e.g., www.oneplace.sex? Internet Porn Would Be Easy to Filter (orFind),
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 5, 1998, at 60 (editorial noting that the Internet is turning into a minefield for parents because "their children are...
inadvertently being exposed to... the profane" and that "[elven word
searches for seemingly innocuous terms can trigger ads for erotica").
126. See America Online (visited Oct. 16, 1998) <http://www.aol.com>.
127. See 1997 Annual Report-America Online, Inc. (visited Oct. 16, 1998)
<http://www.aol.com/corp/nv/reports/1997/6.financials/6_pgO3a.html>.
128. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1190 (1997).
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effort to decrease the viability of other speakers.12 9 In short,
the impossibility of controlling access on the wider Internet
might lead to a convergence among vertically-integrated access
providers-those that could respond by offering a large quantity of proprietary or heavily filtered (i.e., "guaranteed suitable") material. This convergence would make the nonintegrated content providers less viable, and it could reduce
the diversity of media outlets available on the Internet. Given
the Court's "substantial deference to the predictive judgments
of Congress," 130 it is at least plausible that an analogy to
Turner would convince a court that the PICS-enabling statute
is content-neutral.
ii.enabling parental controls: supporting the protection of
children
A second clearly-defined government interest is the support of parents (and perhaps others acting in place of parents,
such as schools) in controlling the sexual and violent content of
the material their children are exposed to on the Internet.
This is an enabling interest rather than a content-based interest: the causal link between the interest and the possible suppression of protected speech is weak at best.131 Therefore, attacks on the statute as content-based would have to overcome
this public-private discontinuity. Significantly, the Court has
held that "the First Amendment, the terms of which apply to
governmental action, ordinarily does not itself throw into constitutional doubt the decisions of private citizens to permit, or
to restrict, speech."132 In essence, the speaker-producers would
129. An obvious rejoinder is that users will not put up with this, and will
either pressure AOL to change its policies, or switch to another ISP. In this
way, AOL competes in a much more robust market than cable operators, who
might have a local monopoly. But the cable operators in Turnerhad, and lost,
this argument as well-that users could simply use over-the-air signals to
tune into the local broadcasters. See Turner,512 U.S. at 661.
130. Id. at 665.
131. One possible route of exploration is through a market-based analysis.
That is, a speaker-producer of protected speech could claim that the existence
of low-cost private choices regarding censorship would result in the constructive suppression of particular views. Although this case is hard to make-it
will depend in large part upon a court's acceptance of network externality
theory and perhaps economic modeling-it is more likely to be a successful
approach to this public-private discontinuity than direct or indirect attacks on
the doctrine itself.
132. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518. U.S. 727,
737 (1996).
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have to show that the government interest in enabling and
empowering private user choices are equivalent to the suppressive interest in direct governmental regulation. There are
three ways that this might play out, one more likely than the
others. First, the most likely scenario is that the Court will
view this as just another cut at the question of "burdens" on
free expression caused by the PICS-enforcing statute. 133 Because the burdens to speech are lower in the private-enabling
regime than in a direct public regulation regime, it is plausible
to conclude that the Court will find that the intermediate scrutiny O'Brien test is satisfied.1 34
The second, and somewhat less likely, scenario is that the
Court will refuse to blur the public-private distinction here,
falling back upon the narrow view the Rehnquist Court has
taken towards the state action doctrine. 135 Under this framework, because the private interests do not bear a direct causal
link to government regulatory interests, there would be no
First Amendment claim at all. Professor Lessig appears to argue for the inverse form of this scenario (although couching it

133. The relative burdens analysis is more properly located in the "fit" or
narrow tailoring inquiry discussed below. See infra notes 142-44, 149-52 and
accompanying text.
134. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also supra
note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the O'Brien test and related Supreme Court holdings).
135. Since the early 1980s, the Court has approached the "state action"
requirement from two perspectives, neither of which seems to weigh in favor
of equating a private ratings system with state action. The first is that used
in Blum v. Yaretsky and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn: that "constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsiblefor the
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1004 (1982); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982).
The second was used in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, where the Court looked to two factors: (1) whether state
authority undergirded the alleged unconstitutional act, and (2) whether the
litigant must be fairly considered a state actor. See Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982). The privately-developed PICS-compatible ratings system is not supported by the PICS-enforcing statute in a Lugar and Edmonson way-the
government's requirement that labels be applied does not bear a causal link to
a particular private ratings system-for in the hypothetical PICS-world, a
(private) market for ratings systems develops. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 8,
at 663. And the private creator of a private ratings system can hardly be
fairly described as a state actor; indeed, there is no certainty that the marketdeveloped ratings systems would even square well with Congressional interests (a risk that Congress may have to take when conceding the details of
ratings to private parties).
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in other terms as discussed below), 136 contending that enforced
PICS would be unconstitutional because of the changes in the
underlying architecture of speech distribution. 137 While there
is perhaps reason to be uneasy about even privately-developed
filtering and labeling schemes, as a descriptive matter, the current doctrine of the public-private distinction does not appear
to support the conclusion that these schemes are unconstitu138
tional.
The third scenario is that the Court may fail to differentiate between the government's interests and its motivation. If
the Court concluded that the government is motivated by the
desire to suppress speech in its implementation of the PICSenforcing statute, and it equated this motivation with a government interest to suppress expression, the private and public
"interests" would appear to be aligned, allowing the Court to
impose strict scrutiny in its review of the statute. However, I
believe that this is an unlikely result given the presence of the
two content-neutral government interests noted above and the
reluctance of the Court to inquire deeply into legislative motivation. 139
Finally, any discussion about the appropriateness of
equating the interests of private ratings developers with the
government's interest cannot overlook the fact that this gets a
plaintiff only part of the way. The final-and crucial-step of
"compelling speech" in this process is performed by the
speaker-producer herself when she selects the content she
wants to ban from her computer screen. To be sure, she is
heavily constrained by the requirement to rate and the particulars of the rating system (or systems) that she chooses, but
she still has a measure of choice and consideration that no
136. Lessig argues that a PICS-enforcing statute would be unconstitutional because it is not narrowly-tailored and runs afoul of the Court's decisions in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) and Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). See Lessig, supra note 8, at
666-67.
137. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 666.
138. This is not to criticize Professor Lessig's efforts to change the thinking
about private-public distinctions. His efforts to do so are important. My intent here, however, is to note how the present doctrine might apply to these
issues, to promote a full understanding of the underlying questions involved.
139. The Court has often disavowed analysis based on legislative motivation. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of Constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive.").
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plaintiff in any of the Court's compelled speech decisions has

had.14

0

Before moving on to the strict scrutiny analysis, it is important to consider how the PICS-enforcing statute will fare
under the "no greater than essential" requirement of the
O'Brien test. 141 The statute is very likely to survive this requirement, primarily because the Court has not closely followed the original standard. 4 2 In Turner, the Court described
the "fit" under intermediate scrutiny as satisfied if the
"regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 43
This new lesser standard for the "fit" would probably be met by
the PICS-enforcing statute given the government interest and
the absence of effective alternatives to governmental intervention. Given the interests at stake and the relatively low burden imposed by the PICS-enforcement requirement, the statute
is likely to survive this element of the O'Brien standard and be
upheld as a content-neutral provision. 144
140. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997) (plaintiffs
forced to pay for generic advertising;,); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind,
487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988) (forced to disclose particular financial details);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (forced to be a "government billboard"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (forced to disclose contributors);
Tornillo v. Miami Herald Co., 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (forced to print others'
speech); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(forced to salute flag).
141. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also supra
note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the O'Brientest and related Supreme Court holdings).
142. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 299 (1984) (holdi-dg that the Court of Appeals' view that there were less
speech-restrictive alternatives available was no more than a disagreement
with the Park Service about the proper implementation of a policy, and that
O'Brien does not "assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park
Service as the manager of the Nation's parks"). See generally Ely, supra note
81, at 1486-88 (noting the "apparent discontinuity" in the Court's approach to
the less restrictive alternative analysis).
143. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 622 (1994) (citing Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 799 (1989)). This is related to the discussion of
equally effective alternatives below. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying
text.
144. Lessig correctly notes that there are differences in the "narrowlytailored" requirement in the content-based and content-neutral cases, but argues that a PICS-enforcing statute would fail either primarily because "[sluch
a regime would result in a wider range of filtered speech than the legitimate
interests of government would allow." Lessig, supra note 8, at 665 n.101. As I
noted above, I view this as another approach to the private-public distinction
that these issues raise. See supra text accompanying notes 123-124. Left out
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c. Strict Scrutiny
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld the mandatory disclosure of large donors to political campaigns notwithstanding the application of strict scrutiny because the requirement was the least restrictive means of addressing the
Congress's "substantial" interest in "curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption."'145 The government's interest
in passing the PICS-enforcing statute may warrant similar
treatment. The statute is intended to protect children, an interest the Court has described as compelling. 146 Relatedly, and
equally importantly, the statute is overwhelmingly intended to
empower parents to control the content of materials viewed by
their children. The Court has called the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children "cardinal"'147 and has repeatedly recognized the strong government interest in supporting these activities. 48 Given the explicit joinder of these
two already significant interests, the Court would probably
find that the government interest in enacting the PICSenforcing statute is compelling.
Then the critical issue becomes the relationship between
the PICS-enforcing statute and the government's interests or
the "fit" between means and ends. In the strict scrutiny/compelled speech context, the Court has required the use
of the "least restrictive means." 149 In other strict scrutiny
cases, the Court has analyzed whether the statute was
"narrowly tailored" to the governmental interests.150 But Professor Volokh has noted that the Court's most recent application of strict scrutiny, in Reno v. ACLU, used an "equally effecof Lessig's claim is the recognition that the "wider range of filtered speech"
would result from a myriad of individual private choices, not from government action to suppress speech. I do not argue that the PICS-enforcing statute will not result in more filtered speech-it surely will-I simply argue that
where the filtering is a private concern, it cannot be analyzed as if it were
state action.
145. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
146. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968).
147. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
148. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Ginsberg, 390
U.S. at 639.
149. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
150. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1995); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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tive alternative" test to strike the CDA. 151 In Reno, the Court
held that the burden on speech was unacceptable because "less
at least as effective" in
restrictive alternatives would be
152
ends.
government's
the
achieving
Applying this doctrine, the "fit" of the PICS-enforcing statute can be viewed in two ways. First, the (theoretical) precision and efficiency of a PICS-enabled system is wholly unprecedented; the cheap labels, self-rating requirement, and
empowerment of parents would appear to be quite narrowly
tailored to the twin interests of protecting children and supporting parents. Unfortunately, it compels labeling of all
speech, even that which the government does not have an interest in shielding from minors, although the Court held in
Ginsbergthat some spillover effects would not render a law unconstitutional.1 53 Certainly "some" allowance for spillover does
not imply that the spillover could necessarily reach all speech
under a Ginsbergset of facts. But spillover implies both quantitative and qualitative judgments, and it is worth remembering here that the burden on speakers-the requirement to rate
pages-is much lower than the flat prohibition on sales considered in Ginsberg. So while the spillover in the PICS-enabling
case is much broader, it would be less burdensome, and thus
might be seen by the Court as roughly equivalent to the statute
at issue in Ginsberg.
The second, and I suspect more difficult, issue for the
PICS-enforcing statute is whether the Court will find it to be
"effective" enough. The government will have to convince the
Court that the labeling requirement is going to work at least as

151. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 148-49 (1997). As Volokh notes,
the Reno v. ACLU test is significantly less protective of speech: the government could overcome the "narrowly tailored" requirement by developing factual findings that the asserted alternatives are not as effective. "The pregnant
negative in the Court's reasoning is that, had there really been no equally effective alternatives (as in fact there are not), the CDA should have been upheld." Id. at 157. In criticizing this approach, Volokh disputes that "tagging,"
as a factual matter, would be as effective as the CDA's flat ban. See id. at 149.
152. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997).
153. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37 (1968). In Reno v. ACLU,
the Court noted that the spillover argument cannot be used to justify the
"unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults." 117 S. Ct. at
2335. As long as the Court determines that the burden on speaker-producers
caused by forced labeling is small, then this "narrowly tailored" argument
would apply.
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effectively as any other equally-restrictive alternative. 154 The
challengers may argue that the PICS-enforcing scheme does
not protect children well enough or that it is likely to be too
complicated to effectively support parental choices. 55 But if
the Court maintains its current mode of analyzing the "fit" requirement on a sort of sliding scale between the burdens and
effectiveness of the law, 156 the low burdens of the PICS statute
will weigh in favor of it being found constitutional.
In sum, the outcome of the compelled speech attack on a
PICS-enforcing statute depends largely upon two questions:
whether the Court finds that the requirement to rate pages
burdens First Amendment rights, and whether the Court accepts the possible content-neutral rationales. If the answer to
either of those questions is yes, then the statute will likely be
found constitutional under current doctrine. If the Court determines that the burden on speech is slight enough to bring
the case into a Meese v. Keene or Glickman v. Wileman Bros.
analysis, it will find that First Amendment issues are not present on the facts and uphold the law under rational basis review. 157 Or, if the Court defers to the content-neutral state interests of facilitating the diversity of speech on the Internet or
enabling parental protection of children, then the Court is
likely to find the law constitutional under O'Brien intermediate
scrutiny.158 If, however, the Court decides that the law is both
154. This strict scrutiny framework-the requirement for the law to be
"narrowly tailored," "equally effective," and/or "least restrictive"--appears to
set up a form of sliding scale analysis. The more restrictive the law (i.e., the
more burdensome on speech), the more closely aligned to the interests asserted and effective it must be. Likewise, laws with little restrictions or burdens may not be forced to be as closely tailored. See Volokh, supra note 151,
at 193-94. Volokh argues that this "weighing" of the benefits and burdens is
judicially inadministrable, and that the Court would be better served in developing more categorical rules regarding substantial and insubstantial burdens. See id. at 194. While I share Professor Volokh's desire for clear rules,
the Court itself has made no signs that it intends to move away from the present mode of analysis. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2335.

155. For example, children would still be able to access improper material
from computers other than their parents', or might be able to break the code
protecting the rating choices on their home computer. The PICS-enforcing
statute also assumes that parents with Internet connections would be knowledgeable enough to implement the controls. Both of these questions are distinctly factual in nature, and ones I think can go either way.
156. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria
the Court uses for determining which standard of review applies).
158. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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burdensome and supported by content-based interests, then
the Court will apply strict scrutiny. In this context, the compelling state interests of protecting children and supporting
parents as compared to the slight burden on speakers might
save the law, although the case is much closer.
2. Interfering with the Architecture of the Speech Market
A second approach a challenger could take to the government's implementation of a PICS-enforcing statute is to argue
that the statute exceeds the constitutional limitations on the
government's power to interfere with the architecture of
speech. 159 Professor Lessig has described the basis of this
claim as follows:
If the government has a legitimate interest in filtering speech of kind
X, but not speech of kind Y and Z, and there are two architectures,
one that would filter speech X, Y and Z, and one that would filter only
speech of kind X, then Congress may constitutionally push technologies of the second kind, but not the first. It may push architectures
that filter speech of kind X only, and not architectures that facilitate
the filtering of speech of kind X, Y, and Z.16

Therefore, the argument goes that because Congress may legitimately directly block a minor's access to certain types of
speech, it may not require PICS-labeling, as PICS is an architecture that enables broader speech filtering.1 61 While innovative and thought-provoking, this "architectural" approach is
difficult to support under present doctrine or theory. 62
The essence of the architecturalists' constitutional claim is
that government-enforced labeling would change the nature of
speech distribution on the net from a default of nondiscrimination to one of discrimination. This, the argument
goes, is equivalent to forcing everyone to request speech before
they receive it, or "as if the state required that all magazines
be vended from behind counters, accessible only upon re159. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 8, at 665-67.
160. Id. at 665.
161 See id at 668.
162. As an initial matter, it is important to note that the architecture that
would support broader filtering does so only by private parties. The public/private distinction-as discussed above-matters a great deal in this
analysis. See supra notes 122-40 and accompanying text. This "architectural"
approach can thus be (fairly, I think) boiled down to a contention that that the
government may not enable broader private regulation if narrower public
regulation is available. And while it is entirely likely that this argument is a
good principle of public policy, the more significant question is whether it has
support in the Constitution.
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quest."' 63 But even if one accepts that this is a change in the
state of speech distribution on the Internet, 164 the argument
appears to assume a statute that requires labeling and specifies the labels themselves. 165 A law that merely requires generalized labeling and leaves the details up to private parties-as
we have assumed heretofore-would not raise the same issues.
This is not "all magazines behind the counter" but rather a rule
that the "counter" must exist for private parties to use if they
choose. Concededly, the market may well force a speakerproducer of sexually-oriented (yet protected) material to vend
her magazine from behind the counter, otherwise the shopkeepers, themselves under pressure from the easily-offended
shop-choosing public, will not stock the magazine anymore.
Thus, the architecturalists' quarrel is with the imposition of
the counter when the government could have simply required
that some magazines could only be sold with proof-of-ageindeed, behind a counter. 166
If one recasts the architectural claim against the PICSenforcing statute that we have considered here-one that
mandates broad labeling, but does not mandate a particular
rating system or require filtering-its weaknesses become
readily apparent. Bolger 167 and Lamont 68 appear to limit the
government's ability to filter and block itself, except in very
narrow circumstances. That much is uncontroversial-and
unlike the PICS-enforcing statute hypothesized in this section.

163. Lessig, supra note 8, at 668.
164. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2342 (1997); Lessig, supra
note 8, at 669.
165. Indeed, it appears to assume a statute that requires PICS labeling of
only that speech which is deemed to be harmful to children. See Lessig, supra
note 8, at 666-68.
166. The architecturalists' argument is thus "exposed" (though it is clear
enough not to need exposure) as another version of the argument against the
rigid publiclprivate distinction established by Supreme Court doctrine: that
courts should consider the enablement of private regulation on (nearly) the
same footing as direct public regulation. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Admittedly, PICS presents this issue pretty squarely-the network
effects and unintended consequences of labels make powerful arguments in
favor of a more flexible state action doctrine. It just doesn't work under the
current technological and legal situation.
167. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (striking
down a government ban on direct-mail advertisements).
168. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (striking down a
requirement that postal recipients specifically request delivery of "communist
propaganda").
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But Rowan 169 appears to go no further than this; at worst, the
case appears to be silent on the proposition of whether the gov17 0 Adernment can itself design and enforce a ratings system.
ditionally, I believe Rowan does not even begin to address the
constitutionality of a statute that requires labeling but does
not provide the labels. Because the architecturalists rely on
cases that themselves appear to recognize the public-private
distinction-or at least lend no authority to ignoring it-the
architectural approach appears to offer little response to a

169. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 729 (1970).
170. I would argue, however, that Rowan does not necessarily compel the
conclusion that the government may not be involved in the design of ratings
systems themselves. While the Post Office in that case merely provided a
ministerial finction, the basis of the decision is clearly that user-selected
choices are constitutionally permissible. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737
("Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any unwanted
communication .... The ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into
which 'not even the king may enter has lost none of its vitality .... "). There
is no suggestion in Rowan that the government may not in some cases further
assist the addressee in blocking unwanted mail, just an offhanded remark
that "Congress provided this sweeping power [to block to the addressee] not
only to protect privacy but to avoid possible constitutional questions that
might arise from vesting the power to make any discretionary evaluation of
the material in a governmental official." Id. This statement implies that the
government may not itselfrate or label speech, but I believe it is silent to the
question of whether the government may create labels for others to use.
The relevant question that we should ask whether Rowan answers is the
following: may the Post Office, in support of addressee's blocking choices, create a set of categories for content sent in the mails (presumably including
various categories that many addressees might find offensive) and force mailers to categorize their mail as such? I am envisioning a sort of second zip
code, containing ratings. Addressees could select which categories of content
they did not wish to receive, and their choices would be administered by the
Post Office. Under Rowan, the addressee has the unquestionable right to
block unwanted mail, and-significantly-the Court tells us that the addressee need not see individual items before they are blocked. See id. at 738
("The continuing operative effect of a mailing ban once imposed presents no
constitutional obstacles; the citizen cannot be put to the burden of determining on repeated occasions whether the offending mailer has altered its material so as to make it acceptable. Nor should the householder have to risk that
offensive material come into the hands of his children before it can be
stopped."). While not crystal clear, I believe this may be fairly read to support
the dual propositions that the Post Office may help reduce the burdens of
blocking from the addressee, and that the addressee need not actually see or
know the specifics of the material blocked. And while it is probably a stretch
to thus claim that Rowan allows government-imposed labeling under government-designated categories, it makes much more questionable the claim that
Rowan forbids the government from designing (and requiring) rating systems.
See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 8, at 668 (arguing that "Rowan limits the government's power" to design rating systems).
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statute exploiting the public-private distinction that it appears
to brush aside.
3. PICS-Enforcement as Compelled Association
A third-and I believe more useful-attack against the
PICS-enforcing statute is that it unconstitutionally compels
the speaker to associate herself with the views of others by
forcing her to label her page according to a ratings system that
she may find abhorrent.1 71 InAbood v. DetroitBoard of Education, the Court recognized a right to refuse to associate, at least
when it involved objectionable views. 172 Using the reasoning in
Abood, the speaker-producer could claim that placing the private rating developer's label on her speech would constitute a
forced association of her speech with the ideas established by
the rating developer. Because this approach explicitly recognizes the existence of the private third party ratings developer,
it may be more factually descriptive of the circumstances and
more likely to succeed than either the compelled speech or architectural challenges described above.
Plainly, the PICS-enforcing statute does not require the
speaker-producer to finance or endorse the rating system. But
this leaves the argument that the rating systems themselves
are ideologically-based, and that forcing a speaker to choose
from a range of labeling options provided by another is
equivalent to associating herself with that ideological viewpoint. 173 That is, if a ratings system offers a choice of one to
171. For example, she may find the "levels" of the ratings system to be
wholly inadequate or offensive in some way. She may feel that the system
does not provide her an opportunity to adequately express her rating of her
content, or may feel offended by having to rate her page for sexual content
even where it contains no such content.
172. 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (striking down compelled fees from Union
members insofar as they were used to support causes members found objectionable). This freedom of "non-association" has been limited by later cases to
those organizations which are expressive in purpose. See, e.g., Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc. 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995) (upholding parade organizers' rights to exclude groups wishing to
march); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 (1988)
(upholding anti-discrimination law targeted at some classes of private clubs);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 611 (1984) (upholding antidiscrimination law as applied to the organization).
173. Note here that I am making an assumption-one that I contend is
reasonable-that the insertion of the PICS "tags" does not alter the content of
the speaker's message. Because PICS tags are invisible to the viewer, they do
not affect the reaction or impact of the message merely by virtue of their insertion. This assumption distinguishes this case from Hurley, where distinct
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five on a "sexuality" scale, does the required selection of one of
the five options constitute association with the ratings system
developer's views on sexuality?
However, in order to succeed on this basis, the Court
would have to adopt a slightly different view on the strands of
the compelled speech and association cases. The underlying
theory would have to be that just as the government cannot
force citizens to espouse the government's views, the government
cannot force the citizens to espouse the views of a privateparty.
This position would find support in Tornillo'7 4 and Pacific Gas
& Electric,I'" in which forced rights of access for others' views
were struck down, albeit as content-based compelled speech
regulations. 76 One could also point to Elrod v. Burns, in which
the Court barred a state from conditioning public employment
on the association with a political party, for support. 7 7 However, other precedent may limit the potential of the forced association with private parties argument. The main limitations
are found in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins 78 and
Glickman v. Wileman Bros.17 9 In Pruneyard,the Court refused
to find that a state-forced right of access violated a shopping
center owner's First Amendment rights because the private
third parties would: (1) "not likely be identified with [the
views] of the owner,"'180 and (2) because the owner could
"expressly disavow" any connection with the others' message
by posting signs.'81 In Wileman Bros., the (5-4) majority decision rejected the compelled speech/association claim of farmers
who objected to being forced to financially support governmentsponsored generic advertising for their products. The Court's
holding rested in part upon the fact that "requiring [plaintiffs]
to pay the assessments [for advertising] cannot be said to engender any crisis of conscience," because the advertising was
intended to help the plaintiffs business. 82 Viewed as a whole,
the cases might be interpreted as prohibiting government
ideological anathema was found unnecessary to the compelled association
claim. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-75.
174. Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
175. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
176. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 20-21; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
177. 427 U.S. 347, 371 (1976).
178. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
179. 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
180. Pruneyard,447 U.S. at 75.
181. Id. at 87.
182. Wileman Bros., 117 S. Ct. at 2139.
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mandates that effectively force citizens to associate with the
views of private third parties where they conflict with one's
own, except where one could effectively disavow such views.
On this reading of the precedent, the PICS-enforcing statute
would be unconstitutional because it forces speaker-producers
to associate themselves with the speech of others, by labeling
their pages according to a third party rating system with which
they may not agree, without providing an opportunity for disavowal.18 3
The essential hurdle posed by this approach is primarily a
factual one: a challenger would have to convince the Court that
ratings systems are ideological in nature and that the
"constraint" imposed by the need to work within the boundaries of another's rating system imposed a significant expressive
burden. Certainly the set-up of a rating system-the choices of
categories to be used, levels to offer, the scope of the optionswould appear to have significant expressive characteristics. 8 4
They certainly reflect a particular view of certain types of
speech. The more difficult question, however, is whether these
expressive choices are burdensome to a speaker-producer to a
degree that the Court would feel significant enough to warrant
invalidation. 8 5 Self-rating means that the ratings system developer has-theoretically at least' 8 6-no say regarding which
level is selected, although the anecdotal evidence so far shows
that the developers will probably attempt to make the selection
of their labels as objective as possible. 8 7 Given the correct set
of facts, i.e., an especially constraining set of choices, a ratings
183. The PICS system does not contemplate the introduction of additional
information beyond the rating labels themselves, so a speaker-producer has
no opportunity to explain or disavow the rating. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
185. In Wileman Bros., the Court noted that the "mere fact that objectors
believe their money is not being well-spent does not mean [that] they have a
First Amendment complaint." 117 S. Ct. at 2140 (citations omitted).
186. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing how one ratings
system, RSACi, forces self-raters using the system to affirm an "agreement"
between the rater and the system developers, and noting that the current
agreement contains provisions for the developers themselves to rate pages if
disputes arise). To the extent that the ratings systems developers inject
themselves into the rating and labeling process, arguments in favor of forced
association only increase.
187. Objectivity can be increased by closely defining the content that each
level can contain. See supra note 46 (discussing the great detail involved in
the RSACi rating system definitions). This interest in objectivity can be as
easily ascribed to a desire for accuracy as to any desire to impose ideology.
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developer that is highly ideologically-based and perhaps willing to rate pages himself, this claim may well succeed where
other approaches have failed. Because the compelled association approach directly addresses the private nature of the ratings systems, in the long run it may turn out to be a useful
check on the scope of publicly-enabled-but-privately-imple188
mented speech regulation.
B. MARKET-INFLUENCING TECHNIQUES
A third major approach Congress might use to get at content regulation on the Internet would be to engage in a series
of indirect activities that have the effect of encouraging-or
perhaps coercing-further filtering and blocking by speakerproducers and end users. These market-influencing techniques
would come in various forms, two examples of which are already seen in proposed legislation: (1) a requirement that ISPs
provide-at no charge or at cost-soft-ware designed to permit
customers to limit access to material that is unsuitable for
children;18 9 and (2) a requirement that schools and libraries requesting "universal service assistance" subsidies from the Federal government and local telecommunications carriers certify
to the FCC that they have selected and installed (or will install) a system to block matter deemed to be inappropriate for
minors. 190 Some other techniques could be used, such as requiring all official government web sites to rate their pages or
by only purchasing software with filtering capabilities builtin.191 In their essence, these influencing techniques seek to do

188. Professor Lessig in particular notes that a chief danger of PICS lies in
what he calls "upstream" filtering rather than simply user filtering. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 660-61. I share his concern on this point-upstream fltering raises issues quite different from those discussed above. But I think
that a compelled association approach to this concern may be more helpful
than the attack on the public-private distinction that Lessig suggests. Under
a compelled association approach, ratings systems supported by a PICSenforcing statute would become more likely to be seen as "compelled" as they
moved further upstream, because of market power and scope of end users
covered. Admittedly, my approach relies upon a PICS-enforcing statute to
create a nexus to the government. Then again, so do other analyses. See, e.g.,
Lessig, supra note 8.
189. See Internet Freedom and Child Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 774,
104th Cong. (1997); Family-Friendly Internet Access Act of 1997, H.R. 1180,
104th Cong (1997).
190. See Safe Schools Internet Act of 1998, H.R. 3177, 104th Cong (1998).
191. The Federal Government used a purchasing-type market-influencing
technique to promote the development of key escrowed encryption technology.
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indirectly-create a regime of content regulation on the netwhat Congress may not (or may not want to) do directly. As
such, they raise questions regarding how the doctrine of unconstitutionalconditions would apply to the new media-and the
new market-of cyberspace.
Put most simply, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions forbids the government to grant a benefit on the condition
that the recipient surrender a constitutional right, even if the
government has the right to withhold the benefit altogether.' 92
Thus, the government may bar federally-funded family planning counselors from mentioning abortion in pregnancy counseling 93 but cannot selectively exempt some magazines from
state taxation based on content. 94 The doctrine is commonly
criticized by commentators as "riven with inconsistencies,195
although as a general principle it is often supported.196 In this
section, I will briefly consider three situations in which unconstitutional conditions are most likely to arise with respect to
Internet content filters: subsidization, procurement, and taxation.
1. Conditioned Subsidization
One candidate for an unconstitutional conditions analysis
is the government's provision of subsidies for Internet use (or
speech) on the condition that the recipients install and/or use
filtering software.197 As an initial matter, identifying the particular claimant is important here. In one (not so hypothetical)
version of the subsidization with strings issue, the government
ties grants to public schools or libraries for improving their infrastructures with the requirement that filtering and blocking

See Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 769-772 (1995).
192. For excellent doctrinal and theoretical treatments of the issue, see
David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-FundedSpeech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Kathleen
Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1988).
193. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
194. See Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
195. Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1416.
196. See id. at 1418-19; Epstein, supra note 192, at 15; Cole, supra note
192, at 681-82.
197. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1419.
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software be installed on the computers. Here, privity matters.
Therefore, the "right" that is being pressured by the grants is
something along the lines of an editorial right delegated to the
local school and library boards, not a schoolchild's or library
patron's right to receive information. 198 This editorial right is
likely to have First Amendment status: school officials have
long been recognized to have broad authority over the conduct
of their schools; 199 and the editorial right has been fully recognized as a critical component of free expression. 200 Arguably, a
governmental requirement to filter and block certain material
would constitute a burden on these rights.201
Given the right and the (arguable) burden caused by the
condition, would this subsidy-with-strings be upheld? In these
types of cases, "the Court has attempted to... [distinguish]
denials of benefits that operate as 'penalties' on speech from
those that operate as mere 'nonsubsidies." 202 Essentially, the
Court views some spheres of government activity as encompassing its role as the regulator and others as pertaining to its
roles as manager or educator. In the first role, abridgements of
speech are seen as suspect and given heightened scrutiny. In
the second, only minimal scrutiny is required. 2 3 This distinction materializes in the cases as follows: (1) the government
may require some financial or physical segregation between

198. The Court has long recognized a right to receive information inherent
in the First Amendment. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 86768 (1982). Note that the end users-who of course are not privy to the bargain-would still perhaps be able to bring a First Amendment challenge
against the school or library on the basis of government-imposed filtering. See
supra Part III.
199. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 70, 81 (1979) (upholding a
state statute forbidding teacher certification of non-citizens); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (noting that "the state may do much, go very
far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens").
200. See Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
201. This assumes the "editorial" right is burdened enough to raise the unconstitutional conditions issue in the first place. It is plausible that the Court
would not consider the "burden" placed upon the right-the alteration in local
editorial control-to rise to the level required. It is well-recognized that the
constitutional interest at issue must rise to the level of a right ordinarily protected by strict judicial review. See Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1427. So the
operative question is whether, standing alone, the removal of some editorial
control over Internet access by the Federal Government would gain strict review. In my view, it probably would, though it is not the clearest case.
202. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIvAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1318 (1997).
203. See id. at 1319.
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speech conducted with public fuinds (which can be circumscribed) and that conducted with private funds; but (2) if
"segregation" is not feasible, the government may not
"leverage" its contribution requirements to effectively encompass private funds; and (3) it may not subsidize selectively on
account of viewpoint discrimination.
Thus, if one assumes that the right of editorial selection is
burdened by the imposition of filtering technologies, then a
subsidy with strings is likely to be upheld unless the government attempts to leverage a relatively small grant into a
broader regulatory power. 20 4 The "leverage" case would arise
under facts substantially similar to FCC v. League of Women
Voters, for example, if Congress required that all schools and
libraries receiving federal funds install and use filtering software on the computers that were connected to the net, even
though the government grant was merely providing for the Internet connection, and private funds had purchased the computers. Assuming the right/burden scenario described above
would be accepted by the Court, a "leveraged" requirement to
filter is likely to be constitutional only if the funds with conditions attached could be separated from other funds; if the government funds purchased computers, then the software could
be installed on them.205 Under the current unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, it is unlikely that the "grant" of universal
service assistance (low or no cost telecommunications services)
would be allowed to result in the imposition of filtering technologies on computers purchased (or donated) with other
2
funds. 06

204- See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
205. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
206. An alternative approach that the Court might take would be in view
of the prohibition on selective subsidization on the basis of viewpoint discrimination. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia,
515 U.S. 819, 831-837 (1995) (striking down a public university's refusal to
support financially a religious student group on the basis of viewpoint discrimination). Assuming in this case that the Federal Government enforced
filtering of sexual material, the "viewpoint" that would be discriminated
against would probably be "sexuality," which is not among the range of viewpoints that ordinarily leaps to mind when considering viewpoint discrimination. But it's no more odd than the Court's invocation of "religion" as a viewpoint in Rosenberger.
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2. Utilizing Procurement Power
Unconstitutional conditions might also be raised if the
government used its procurement power to influence the market for Internet software in an attempt to bring about widespread filtering. In broad strokes, a challenger would argue
that the government violates the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine when it uses its market power to so alter the terrain
upon which other speakers make choices as to effectively constrain those choices. Here I am thinking of two primary examples, although there are probably several others. The first is
what I will call "opt-out influencing": the Federal Government
might purchase only web browser software that contained certain levels of filtering and blocking. 207 Assuming that the government had enough purchasing power, 208 this policy might influence browser manufacturers to standardize on this opt-out
state, resulting in much broader use of filtering and blocking,
and thus greatly incenting speaker-producers to rate their
pages or be effectively invisible to a large portion of users. I
call the second example "hyperlink influencing": the Federal
Government could refuse to provide or allow hyperlinks from
any of its web pages to those pages that were not rated by a
particular PICS-enabled rating system. I will consider the issues raised by each of these examples in turn.
a. Influencing the Code: Opt-Out Browser Software
The obstacles to challenging this form of government influence are formidable. The first is identifying a suitablyburdened right. While the "benefit" is relatively easy to identify-the purchase of software in the first instance or the establishment 2 9 or allowance 2 10 of hyperlinks in the second-one
must still decide whether the "right" that is being burdened is
207. It could also more simply require that any filtering and blocking options be turned "on" by default, a less extreme case that nonetheless might
have similar market-influencing effects.
208. This is probably a stretch, but I would argue not wholly implausible.
If the browser manufacturers were otherwise near indifference regarding the
filtering and blocking features (say because of some significant consumer demand), then the addition of even some governmental purchasing influence
might make a difference.
209. For a speaker-producer, hyperlinks from other pages are among the
most valuable assets. Indeed, the provision of hyperlinks (usually via advertisements) is a foundation of the current commercialization of cyberspace.
210. See, e.g., Link Law on the Internet: A Panel Discussion,38 IDEA 197
(1998).
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one that would, if burdened directly, be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny. In the "opt-out influencing" example, there are a few
"rights" that might arguably be burdened. 211 The first is the
right of the software producer to produce software with whatever parameters it chooses-this First Amendment right of
software writing has been asserted in some contexts, although
it is not widely recognized. 212 The second right that might be
burdened is the right of the end user to effectively choose not to
block certain content-either because of the difficulties in
changing the default opt-out settings in the software or because the software is hard-wired for opt-out and cannot be
changed. This argument would rest upon the well-recognized
First Amendment right to receive information. 2 13 A third right
that might be burdened is the right to be free from compelled
speech as asserted by the speaker-producers whose choices of
whether to rate are constrained by the increased use of filtering and blocking caused by the predominance of software with
an opt-out state. Although the right against compelled speech
is well-recognized, whether the "compulsion" of rating one's
web pages rises to the constitutional level (or fails to) will depend in large part upon whether the arguments in Part
IV(A)(1) above are accepted.
A second major issue raised by the "opt-out influencing"
example is the relationship between unconstitutional conditions and privity. Unconstitutional conditions doctrine commonly assumes a bargained-for exchange: a benefit granted in
exchange for the curtailment of a right.214 In some cases, the

211. I ignore here the claims of federal employees, who may themselves
have a claim under a right-to-receive information theory. See United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995) (noting the
public's right to receive information); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867
(1982) (describing the importance of the right to receive ideas). Obviously,
this claim is not unique to this context.
212. For example, those challenging the Federal Government's restrictions
on the export of encryption technology rely heavily upon the claim that computer software is speech. See Bernstein v. Department of State, 922 F. Supp.
1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that cryptographic source code is speech).
See generally R. Polk Wagner, The Medium Is the Mistake: The Law of Software for the FirstAmendment, 51 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1999).
213. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (quoting Madison to emphasize the right's
importance). For an excellent treatment of the right to receive information in
the cyberspace context, see Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A
Closer Look at 'Copyright Management' in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981
(1996).
214. See Epstein, supra note 192, at 7.
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curtailment of the right will be so constitutionally suspect as to
215 But does the conmake the "bargain" itself unconstitutional.
tractual analogy extend to a requirement of privity? That is,
does the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions require at least
a nominal bargaining relationship-privity-between the government and the recipient of the benefit? This issue is
squarely raised by the opt-out influencing example described
above: the rights of the end user to receive information and the
speaker-producer to "not rate" were not burdened through any
deal they cut with the government. To the extent that they are
burdened, they are only burdened by the choices made by the
software producer and the operation of the market. If privity is
required to make an unconstitutional conditions claim-and I
perhaps the
can find no case that suggests that it is not-then
2 16
circumstances.
these
fit
doctrine doesn't quite
b. Burdening the Hyperlink: Conditioning'Access' to
Government Pages
The hyperlink influencing case offers the chance to address more directly the unconstitutional conditions issue.
Here, the burdened right is also the right against compelled
speech, and privity is easily established: the government benefit is the hyperlink, either given or allowed, and the condition
is that the speaker-producer rate her speech. I believe that
this issue will turn largely on two questions: first, does the
right to "not rate" rise to the level of that necessary to trigger
the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; and
second, is the refusal to allow or provide hyperlinks a nonsubsidy of speech or a penalty for exercising the right to "not rate"?
In light of the discussion in Part IV(B)(2) above, we need
not linger long on the first question, except to note that "the
constitutional interest at issue must rise to the level of a recognized right-indeed, a preferred right normally protected by

215. See id. at 8.
216. This is obviously an area for further exploration. Without the application of unconstitutional conditions, I see no other avenue for the end users
and speaker-producers to challenge the restraints on their expression-the
public-private distinction is even stronger in this context (where the government is acting in its capacity as a purchaser rather than regulator) than in
the compelled speech context noted above. Again, because the architecturalist
view does not recognize the significance of the public-private distinction, it
seems of no more help here than in the prior examples. See supra notes 16566 and accompanying text.
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strict judicial review."217 Otherwise, the government could accomplish the end directly, without having to resort to indirect
means. Therefore, if my conclusion that a compelled speech
claim would not invalidate a government-imposed labeling requirement is correct, then the unconstitutional conditions
claim is unsound as well.
The second question is, I believe, also easily disposed of.
Given the apparent broad latitude that the Court has given the
government in the subsidized speech context, 218 I believe that
the refusal of hyperlinking is unlikely to be seen as significant
enough to be characterized as a penalty. Given the huge numbers of web pages available, restrictions on linking to (or from)
would seem a relatively slight burden. Indeed, following the
logic of Taxation With Representation,219 the speaker-producer
desiring the government "subsidy" (the link) would simply
have to restructure its web site: perhaps by creating a rated
"intermediate" page that would be segregated from the remainder of the unrated content, or by linking to or from the
government site via an intermediary web site.22 0 Given the low
cost of such restructuring, courts would likely find that the
government condition was permissible, even if the right to "not
rate" is recognized as one of heightened constitutional significance.
3. Influencing via Taxation
Finally, conditioning tax exemptions for Internet speakerproducers on the labeling or rating of the speaker-producer's
speech would raise a plausible unconstitutional conditions
question. The Court has determined that Congress may not
grant tax exemptions that discriminate among speakers on the
basis of content 22 1 but that it may require that a recipient segregate activities as a condition of receipt of a government beneflt.222

Here, the right-to "not rate"-and the benefit-a gov-

ernment (tax) subsidy-are the same as the right and benefit
discussed immediately above.
Most pertinently, the
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
(1987).
222.
544.

Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1427.
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
See id. at 547-50.
See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-32
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197; Taxation With Representation,461 U.S. at
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"restructuring" argument from the hyperlinking context is perhaps available here; indeed, this case looks even more like
Taxation With Representation. This does provide an opportunity to explore the argument for unconstitutionality not noted
above, although it may also apply in that context, that the 2re23
fusal to grant the condition is impermissibly content-based.
Because the government is basing the condition on whether the
speaker-producer has labeled her speech, i.e., whether the label is present, the scheme might be said to be explicitly content-based. Viewed this way, the tax subsidy224 treats speakerproducers that do attach labels to their pages differently from
those that do not. The criticism of this point, however, is that
the labeling requirement is not really content-based-it is
wholly neutral regarding the underlying content of the speech,
it just discriminates according to whether an invisible label is
attached, and is indifferent even to the content of that label.
This argument is essentially the same one discussed above in
Part IV(A)(1)(b). And, as I argued there, the slight burden that
the labeling requirement imposes will ultimately lead the
Court to decide that such restrictions are content-neutral
rather than content-based.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, because it addresses the sort of indirect market-influencing activity that
Congress may well consider in the Internet regulation context,
is a useful field for further exploration of these issues. Significantly, however, it does not seem at this time to be able to address the broader range of possible market-based influences
that may result from government activities. In particular, the
theories of privity and market coercion raise difficult questions
for the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
to these issues.
C. IN THE SHADOW OF REGULATION: ACTS, NON-ACTS, AND
STATE ACTION

It is generally believed that some form of overt government
action is needed to raise constitutional issues-government
advocacy, suggestions, and perhaps even threats or bullying do

223. See Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 233 (applying strict scrutiny to the selective application of a sales tax to magazines and holding the
tax unconstitutional).
224. Though it would seem to apply as well to the hyperlinking issue.
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not typically raise such questions.2 2 5 Thus, the range of permissible government activities that involve what might be
called the shadow of regulation are quite broad and may be increasingly likely avenues that the Federal Government will
pursue in its attempt to regulate Internet content.2 2 6 The interesting question in this context is where the "shadow" ends.
That is, where is the "line" that the government cannot cross
without enabling Constitutional claims against itself.
Several commentators have suggested that the current issues regarding PICS and Internet content filters bear some resemblance to the "V-Chip" intended to enable future content
regulation of broadcast and cable television. 227 In the V-Chip
context, the government has already acted: provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 will soon require all television
sets sold in the United States to contain the means to filter and
block programming.22 8 It is not my purpose to explore the constitutionality of the V-Chip rating and filtering system here.
Rather, I want to point out that the rating system that is (or
indeed, has been) voluntarily introduced by the broadcasters
may raise similar state action issues to the Internet filtering
context.
Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 outlines a publicly-supported but privately-implemented system
for rating the content of television shows. The Act requires
that distributors of such programming establish and implement "voluntary rules" for rating content and broadcast such
ratings with the shows 229-a system that eventually developed
and has been implemented. If such a system had not developed, the FCC was authorized to form an advisory committee
to issue guidelines and recommend procedures, as well as to
promulgate rules requiring the transmission of ratings if they
existed.230 For our purposes, an interesting question is
whether such a scheme constitutes state action. The ready answer, of course, is that it unquestionably does: the government
225. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991);
TRIBE, supra note 81, § 12-4; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES
246-48 (1985) [hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES].
226. See, e.g., President's Remarks, supra note 2.
227. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 642; Matthew L. Spitzer, An Introduction
to the Law and Economics of the V-Chip, 15 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 429,
433 n.12 (1997).
228. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(c), 110 Stat. 56, 141 (1996).
229. See id. § 551(e).
230. See id. § 551(b).
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actually requires the V-Chip, for example. But what claims
arise from the state action? In order for a speaker-producer to
bring a cognizable First Amendment claim, she will have to
show how a state action directly-or, perhaps in the case of unconstitutional conditions, indirectly-burdened her rights to
free expression.
In this sense it is important to note the distinct-but-related
nature of the state action and unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The state action requirement tells us where the "zones"
of private and public behavior meet and, ideally at least, tells
us where the line is drawn.231 The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine appears to in large measure take up where the state
action doctrine leaves off: addressing situations where the government is plainly acting but perhaps is attempting to do
something indirectly that it may not do directly. 232 The two
may not quite meet in the middle-for example, I cannot think
of how to overcome the lack of state action with respect to the
end user in the opt-out influencing hypothetical described
above, yet the apparent requirement for privity makes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine also inapplicable. 233 What
doctrine will apply (if any) will depend upon the nature and direction of the claim; carefully analyzing the difference between
the two theories will strengthen the underlying determination.
For example, if the broadcaster of a television show wishes
to bring a "right not to rate" claim under the current selflabeling scheme, she is unlikely to successfully argue that the
labeling "requirement" itself is state action.234 A more fruitful

231. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 225, at 246.
232 See Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1415.
233. See supra note 214-216 and accompanying text.
234. On this conclusion I differ with the analysis conducted by Professor
Spitzer. He notes four reasons that he believes state action is present in the
V-Chip case: (1) Congressional suggestions that the governmental grant of
digital bandwidth be tied to a system of content rating;, (2) requiring the VChip in the television set itself, (3) governmental threats, advocacy, and review of the system; and (4) the requirement that ratings be transmitted if
they exist. See Spitzer, supra note 227, at 433-51.
Factors (1), (2), and (4), however, seem more appropriately analyzed under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine than under state action. In these
three cases, state action unquestionably exists (I'm assuming that (1) was actually legislated-it is simply irrelevant if it was not); the task now is to show
how the state action impermissibly forces the distributor to label her show.
For example, if the Congress conditioned the grant of additional spectrum on
the imposition of ratings, then the question is not simply whether the government acted to burden a right, but whether this constitutes an impermissi-
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avenue of pursuit might be to claim that the labeling requirement was a result of an unconstitutional conditions bargainProfessor Spitzer notes that the Federal Government was considering using the allocation of new digital spectrum as a
"carrot" to force content rating. By focusing on the state action
that is present, i.e., the labeling requirement, rather than
downplaying the specific action required to label, a challenger
may be able to bring the claim more successfully.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between filters and the First Amendment
might be said to be an uneasy one. The rapidly-changing technology and its relationship to the law puts not insignificant
pressure on current doctrinal concepts; traversing this path is
difficult, and analytical obstacles abound. Yet the journey is
worth the effort-a solid footing on technological and doctrinal
foundations will provide the best support for future development in this area.
The direct approach to the technology and doctrine followed in this essay yields the conclusion that most of the government's indirect attempts to establish or support a PICSenabled filtering regime would be constitutional. This conclusion offers cautions to friends and foes of increased governmental regulation alike, however. A common thread running
ble burden on First Amendment rights-an impermissible bargain. Similarly,
requiring the V-Chip in TV sets is itself a clear governmental act-the question is whether the act conditions access to those television sets upon the use
of a ratings system. A very analogous analysis would exist for factor (4). The
question of the relationship between an existing government act and a burdened right is one for unconstitutional conditions rather than state action.
Factor (3), however, raises questions of state action, but appears to fall
far short of the level of "action" required: the "entanglement" principle that
Spitzer relies upon in his analysis, see id. at 439, is more properly viewed
through what Professor Tribe calls the "close-up lens" form of analysis.
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 225, at 248. This lens looks at
the nexus between a state activity and the person or entity who might be
blamed. See id. It is not a theory of coercion. Cf Spitzer, supra note 227, at
442 ("[The drafting of both the present ratings and brawnier new system was
as voluntary as facing a firing squad.") (quoting Howard Rosenberg, Holdout
by NBC to Provide Real Test, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1997, at Fl). The nexus to
an actual state regulation is a necessary element of the "close-up lens" analysis. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 225, at 250. Reducing
state action to "pressure from President Clinton, threats from congressmen,"
see Spitzer, supra note 227, at 444, or even the non-binding recommendations
of the FCC would go a long way toward making the requirement for state action meaningless.
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through the analyses is the importance of the public-private
distinction. And, while the distinction may in some cases aid
the government in indirectly supporting private regulation of
content, an important basis of that conclusion is the continued
existence of robust choices for the end user and speakerproducer.
Finally, the conclusion that many of the government's activities with respect to filters and the First Amendment only
highlight the importance of the political and legislative processes in resolving these issues. Although the architecture of
PICS allows myriad private choices to influence the state of the
Internet, there is still a significant role for the governmentespecially the legislative and executive branches-in helping to
shape the architecture itself. Those who believe that PICS and
other filtering technologies are going to be ultimately detrimental to expression are well advised to focus their efforts on
creating a politics of filters as well as a new constitutional doctrine; it may be that the expansive protection from even private
content regulation that they seek will be found in the Congress
rather than the courts.

